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ARTICLE
CLASSROOMS INTO COURTROOMS
Naomi Mann*
ABSTRACT
The federal Department of Education’s (DOE) 2020 Title IX
Rule fundamentally transformed the relationship between
postsecondary schools (schools) and students. While courts have
long warned against turning classrooms into courtrooms, the 2020
Rule nonetheless imposed a mandatory quasi-criminal courtroom
procedure for Title IX sexual harassment investigatory
proceedings in schools. This transformation is a reflection of the
larger trend of importing criminal law norms and due process
protections into Title IX school proceedings. It is especially
regressive at a time where calls for long-overdue criminal justice
reform are reaching a boiling point across the nation. Its effects
are especially troubling because DOE linked the changes with
tenets of rape exceptionalism, which has historically burdened
women alleging rape, notably those with marginalized identities.
As a result, the 2020 Rule requires schools to treat survivors of
sexual assault, who are disproportionately women, LQBTQIA+,
BIPOC, or a combination, differently than those who report
*
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discrimination based on other protected identities, such as race.
While Obama-era guidance sought to effectuate Title IX’s equality
aim by mandating that schools make significant changes to
redress a history of limited Title IX enforcement and to align Title
IX with classic models of civil rights implementation, DOE’s 2020
Rule swung the pendulum far in the opposite direction, creating a
very different mandatory system for schools that is unfairly
balanced in favor of respondents. This pattern of shifting
obligations for schools will continue until a concerted effort is
made to return to what Title IX stands for at its base—equal access
to education for all students. The Office for Civil Rights and
schools must refocus and recenter on Title IX’s promise of ensuring
equal education based on sex, especially in light of the 2020 Rule.
In this Article I argue that Title IX enforcement must: (1) start
viewing schools as educational institutions, not courts of law, and
(2) incorporate an intersectional approach throughout all aspects
of its implementation. Creating a Title IX that works means
studying and developing policies and procedures that incorporate
intersectionality; it means aligning with general civil rights law
implementation; and fundamentally, it means bringing the
pendulum to rest.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of sexual assault on college and university
campuses has become a lightning rod. Columbia University, one of
many postsecondary schools (schools)1 caught in the crossfire over
its handling of internal Title IX2 disciplinary cases, recently
reached a startling court settlement agreement with a former
student.3 The settlement was surprising, in part, because the court
information about the school’s disciplinary decision was so
inconsistent with the purported settlement agreement terms. In
2017, as part of an internal school disciplinary proceeding,
Columbia University had apparently determined that the student
had violated the university’s student code of conduct and found
him “responsible for three instances of sexual assault.”4 As a result
of this determination, made under a Title IX process compliant
1.
In this Article, I use the terms “schools,” “colleges,” “universities,” and “campuses”
to refer to postsecondary educational institutions covered by Title IX.
2.
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688.
3.
See Anemona Hartocollis, Columbia Settles a Complicated Sexual Assault Case,
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/11/us/columbia-sexual-assault.html [https://
perma.cc/FTE5-46F8] (Jan. 29, 2021).
4.
The school’s decision is not publicly available. These facts are drawn from the
court’s recitation of facts in the case. See Feibleman v. Trs. of Columbia Univ. (Feibleman
I), No. 19-CV-4327, 2020 WL 882429, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2020) (“The panel reportedly
found Feibleman responsible for three instances of sexual assault based on a preponderance
of the evidence standard: (1) non-penetrative sexual contact atop the water tower,
(2) digital penetration in Doe’s bedroom, and (3) non-penetrative sexual contact in Doe’s
bedroom.” (first citing Compl. (Dkt. 57) ¶¶ 699, 760; and then citing Gender-Based
Misconduct Policy (“GBMP”) (Dkt. 48-1) at 4, 7, 24, 27)). This court statement is consistent
with Mr. Feibleman’s pleadings, which dispute Columbia’s finding that he was
“‘responsible’ for sexual harassment and sexual assault.” Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law
in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint at 1, Feibleman I, 2020 WL
882429 (No. 19-CV-04327), 2019 WL 8165737.
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with Obama Administration requirements, Columbia University
took the unusual step of expelling the student and rescinding his
degree.5 He responded by filing an action against Columbia
University alleging, inter alia, that the university violated his
Title IX rights by “depriv[ing] him of educational benefits by
failing to investigate his counter-accusations against his accuser.”6
A firestorm ensued regarding the fairness of Columbia
University’s adjudication process and its decision in this case.7
News of a settlement agreement sparked even more
controversy.8 Though Columbia University issued a statement
standing by its disciplinary findings regarding the student, the
university agreed to restore the student’s diploma and pay him an
undisclosed settlement amount.9 The student’s attorney
characterized “the reinstatement of [the] degree and the
‘significant’ financial payment he will receive as part of the
settlement [as] an admittance of wrongdoing by the university,
even if it’s not outright.”10 By contrast, Jane Doe’s attorney stated
that “[n]othing about his settlement changes what happened to my
client, nor does it change the fact that her complaint was validated
at every step of the university’s process, and she stands by her
complaint.”11
Columbia’s conflicting actions—standing by their disciplinary
findings yet reversing the sanctions—illustrate the complexities of
5.
Feibleman I, 2020 WL 882429, at *1–2, *7.
6.
Feibleman v. Trs. of Columbia Univ. (Feibleman II), No. 19-CV-4327, 2020 WL
3871075, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2020). The court granted in part defendant Columbia
University’s motion to dismiss, Feibleman I, 2020 WL 882429, at *8, and denied Mr.
Feibleman’s subsequent motion to amend his complaint, Feibleman II, 2020 WL 3871075,
at *1.
7.
See Kristine Solomon, Expelled Columbia Journalism Student Accused of Rape
Sues University over ‘Anti-Male’ Bias, YAHOO! LIFE (May 15, 2019), https://www.yahoo.
com/lifestyle/expelled-columbia-journalism-student-accused-rape-sues-university-antimale-bias-162059965.html [https://perma.cc/83UJ-UTBV] (Feibleman’s attorney stated,
“Columbia University grievously mishandled this case. Columbia discriminated against
Mr. Feibleman on the basis of his gender in violation of Title IX”); Andrew Denney, Expelled
Columbia Journalism Student Accused of Rape Is Victim of ‘Anti-Male’ Bias: Lawsuit, N.Y.
POST (May 14, 2019, 10:14 PM), https://nypost.com/2019/05/14/expelled-columbia-journalis
m-student-accused-of-rape-is-victim-of-anti-male-bias-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/99L4-KM
BB] (“It’s open season on men at Columbia University thanks to the Ivy League school’s
handling of sexual-harassment allegations against male students, a new lawsuit charges.”).
8.
See Greta Anderson, Perpetrator or Victim?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 12, 2021), h
ttps://www.insidehighered.com/news/2021/01/12/columbia-u-settles-alumnus-accused-rape
[https://perma.cc/J2XR-RF9B].
9.
Hartocollis, supra note 3 (referencing Columbia statement that the “disciplinary
findings remain unchanged”).
10.
Anderson, supra note 8.
11.
Hartocollis, supra note 3.
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Title IX implementation in the last decade. While the reasons for
their contradictory positions are certainly nuanced, they are
undoubtedly and inextricably linked to the changes in Title IX
enforcement from the Obama Administration to the Trump
Administration and the resultant standards schools must meet.
The New York Times put it plainly, “[The] suit was settled after
the Trump administration had adopted a [new] regulation.”12
Title IX has become a political seesaw in the last decade, with
its meaning and coverage tied to the current presidential
Administration in power rather than on its text and purpose. On
the one hand, the Obama Administration made a number of
well-documented changes to Title IX interpretation and
enforcement aimed at redressing prior lax enforcement, increasing
complainant reporting, and aligning Title IX investigatory
proceedings with a classic civil rights model.13 This included
increased and very public enforcement of Title IX requirements
against schools.14 On the other hand, the Department of Education
(DOE) under Betsy DeVos (the DeVos DOE) implemented a new
regulation (the 2020 Rule) in August 2020 that made a number of
dramatic changes to the agency interpretation of Title IX.15 In the

12.
Id. (“That suit was settled after the Trump administration had adopted a
regulation to give more due process protections to the accused, generally men, effective in
August [2020].”) It’s hard to imagine that the new regulation did not impact the changed
posture towards the case, even though it was not retroactive.
13.
See Nancy Chi Cantalupo, And Even More of Us Are Brave: Intersectionality &
Sexual Harassment of Women Students of Color, 42 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 11–16 (2019)
(describing the changes from the Obama Administration and how efforts to “criminalize”
Title IX are in part a backlash to the Obama Administration’s “stepped-up enforcement of
Title IX with regard to sexual harassment”); Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex
Bureaucracy, CALIF. L. REV. 881, 900–01 (2016); Michelle J. Anderson, Campus Sexual
Assault Adjudication and Resistance to Reform, 125 YALE L.J. 1940, 1973–76 (2016)
(describing guidance and clarifications released in 2011 and 2014); Deborah L. Brake,
Fighting the Rape Culture Wars Through the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard, 78
MONT. L. REV. 109, 126 (2017) (describing how Office of Civil Rights in 2011 “requir[ed]
colleges and universities to act independently of any criminal law enforcement processes,
and to use the standard of proof for civil and not criminal cases”).
14.
In May 2014, OCR broke with its tradition of discreet investigations of schools
and released a list of the universities under investigation that it continued to update until
the end of the Obama Administration. See U.S. Department of Education Releases List of
Higher Education Institutions with Open Title IX Sexual Violence Investigations, U.S. DEP’T
OF EDUC. (May 1, 2014), https://web.archive.org/web/20201101173534/https:/www.ed.gov/n
ews/press-releases/us-department-education-releases-list-higher-education-institutions-op
en-title-i [https://perma.cc/RL5A-J427]; see also Jessica C. Harris & Chris Linder, Preface
to INTERSECTIONS OF IDENTITY AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE ON CAMPUS xi, xi (Jessica C. Harris
& Chris Linder eds., 2017) (“By April 2016, 178 institutions of higher education were under
investigation by the OCR for mishandling sexual violence cases.”).
15.
34 C.F.R. §§ 106.18, 106.30, 106.44, 106.45, 106.46, 106.62.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3999428

59 HOUS. L. REV. 363 (2021)

368

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[59:2

2020 Rule, the DeVos DOE leveraged critiques16 that the Obama
Administration had swung the pendulum too far towards
complainants in order to effectuate the goal of watering-down Title
IX and swung it dramatically towards respondents’17 rights,
notably those claiming to be wrongfully accused of sexual
assault.18 In doing so, the 2020 Rule created a quasi-criminal
courtroom system for Title IX investigatory proceedings, including
disciplinary proceedings, that is at odds with the educational focus
and nature of schools. These changes, if maintained, will
fundamentally alter the relationship between schools and their
students and effectuate the long-warned-against transformation
of classrooms into courtrooms.19

16.
For some of the critiques aimed at the Obama Administration’s rule, see, for
example, Peter Berkowitz, College Rape Accusations and the Presumption of Male Guilt,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405311190359690457
6516232905230642 [https://perma.cc/YUR8-DJ82]; Ariel Kaminer, New Factor in Campus
Assault Cases: Counsel for the Accused, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.nytimes.co
m/2014/11/20/nyregion/new-factor-in-campus-sexual-assault-cases-counsel-for-the-accused
.html [https://perma.cc/L27L-GCCA] (detailing the rise of attorneys assisting respondents
in sexual assault disciplinary proceedings due to the perception that a “rush to judgment”
is leading to unfair processes for respondents); Elizabeth Bartholet et al., Opinion, Rethink
Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 14, 2014, 9:00 PM), https://www.bos
tonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-harvard-sexual-harassment-policy/HFDDiZN7n
U2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html [https://perma.cc/NT9K-MEZL] (arguing that Harvard’s
new sexual harassment policies “lack the most basic elements of fairness and due process”);
Letter from Ann E. Green, Chair, Comm. on Women in the Acad. Pro., and Cary Nelson,
President, Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, to Russlyn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for C.R., U.S. Dep’t
of Educ. Off. for C.R. (Aug. 18, 2011), https://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/FCF5808A-999D4A6F-BAF3-027886AF72CF/0/officeofcivilrightsletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/RDJ4-AZQY]
(arguing that OCR’s decision to mandate use of the preponderance of the evidence standard
will not adequately protect respondents); Aya Gruber, Anti-Rape Culture, 64 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1027, 1052–53 (2016) (“Campus sexual assault reform is still nascent, and now is the
time to be self-reflective rather than unyielding and to take stock of what is going on before
well-intentioned feminist strategies turn into authoritarian institutions.”).
17.
The student who brings a sexual assault complaint will be referred to as a
complainant. This language is consistent with that used by OCR in its Title IX
investigations. See OFF. FOR C.R., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., CASE PROCESSING MANUAL (CPM)
5 & n.1 (2020) [hereinafter OFF. FOR C.R., CASE PROCESSING MANUAL], https://www2.ed.gov
/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/ocrcpm.pdf [https://perma.cc/EX4F-ANYB]. The student who is
the subject of a sexual assault complaint will be referred to as a respondent. This language
is consistent with that used by OCR in its Title IX investigations. See id. at 30 n.12.
18.
See infra notes 93–101 and accompanying text; see also Susan Svrluga,
Transcript: Betsy DeVos’s Remarks on Campus Sexual Assault, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/09/07/transcript-betsy-de
voss-remarks-on-campus-sexual-assault/ [https://perma.cc/T7AR-7W2B] (noting DeVos’s
remarks in which she articulated the focus on accused students); Cantalupo, supra note 13,
at 10–11 (detailing the various forms that the backlash against perceived unfairness in
Title IX took, including legislation and aggressive defamation lawsuits).
19.
Jaksa v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 597 F. Supp. 1245, 1250 (E.D. Mich. 1984),
aff’d, 787 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1986) (“While a university cannot ignore its duty to treat its
students fairly, neither is it required to transform its classrooms into courtrooms.”).
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With the advent of the Biden/Harris Administration and
concomitant changes expected to Title IX policies,20 it is a pivotal
moment to take stock of the last decade’s varied approaches and
animating philosophies of Title IX implementation. It is an
opportunity to reflect on what has been effective, what has been
consistent with Title IX, and what needs to change. The
politicization of Title IX, and the 2020 Rule’s importation of a
quasi-criminal courtroom model into school investigatory
proceedings, have sharply curtailed Title IX’s promise of ensuring
equal access to education based on sex and led to contradictory and
confusing mandates for schools. Title IX is the primary tool that
students use when trying to obtain equal access to education based
on sex, and it is therefore too critical to allow it to continue to be
appropriated in this manner.
This Article proposes that DOE and schools refocus on Title
IX’s equality goals separate from the past decade’s political seesaw
in Title IX interpretation and guidance. Part II outlines Title IX’s
primary goals and purposes. Part III analyzes the key changes
made by the 2020 Rule and their effects on educational
institutions. Part IV posits that the 2020 Rule is animated by two
intertwined theoretical underpinnings—rape exceptionalism and
a form of criminally grounded due process in the education context
that I call the due process distortion21—and the way that these
underpinnings are in tension with the goals and purposes of Title
IX. Part V provides a set of dual principles to guide both DOE and
schools moving forward: (1) the primacy of schools’ role as
educational institutions, not courts of law; and (2) the need for
DOE to center Title IX’s equality goals by requiring schools to craft
effective intersectional Title IX investigatory systems. This Article
concludes by proposing that both DOE and schools focus on
researching and building systems that incorporate Title IX’s
fairness and equality touchstones, reflect the reality of how
20.
Because it followed the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, the
2020 Rule will stay in place until it is revoked, which will be a lengthy process.
21.
Sage Carson & Sarah Nesbitt, Balancing the Scales: Student Survivors’ Interests
and the Mathews Analysis, 43 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 319, 333–34 (2020) (“Although ‘due
process’ has become the battle cry of the respondents’ rights movement, the content of that
battle cry does not match the meaning of due process as determined by the courts.”
(footnotes omitted)); id. at 343 (“[C]ourts have grafted the Mathews two-party analysis
directly onto sexual misconduct cases, accounting for respondents and institutions and all
but erasing complainants.”). Other scholars have noted that procedural due process is
sometimes defined in a different manner in the Title IX education context. See, e.g., Lesley
Wexler, 2018 Symposium Lecture: #MeToo and Procedural Justice, 22 RICH. PUB. INT. L.
REV. 181, 182 (2019) (describing colloquial due process as “non-legal or colloquial invocation
of due process” that attempts to root itself in notions of fairness).
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identity and sexual assault intersect on campuses,22 and are in line
with general civil rights law implementation in schools, regardless
of the presidential Administration currently in power.
II. TITLE IX: GOALS AND AIMS
Title IX is a civil rights statute that protects individuals from
being discriminated against on the basis of sex in education.
Specifically, Title IX provides: “No person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance . . . .”23 Title IX applies to most educational institutions
in the United States, as all public schools and most private schools
receive some form of federal funding.24
Title IX’s purpose is to protect an equal access to education
based on sex.25 Title IX was partially proposed as a reaction to the
lack of sex-based discrimination provisions in the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.26 As Senator Birch Bayh, a leading proponent of Title IX,
22.
As detailed infra in sections IV.A and V.B, the intersections between identity and
sexual assault have been understudied, not emphasized by OCR, and investigatory systems
have largely failed to explicitly consider such intersections, instead focusing on one model
for who sexual assault survivors are and what form of response will therefore be effective.
23.
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). While the text of Title IX says “sex,” per the decision in
Bostock, the term “sex” should be read to include gender identity and sexual orientation.
See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020) (reading the term “sex” in Title
VII to include gender identity and sexual orientation). When talking about Title IX, I use
the statutory language of “sex” but use it to be inclusive of gender identity and sexual
orientation per Bostock.
24.
Title IX and Sex Discrimination, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.: OFF. FOR C.R., https:
//www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html [https://perma.cc/SZ6N-UYTC] (last
modified Aug. 20, 2021) (stating 17,600 local school districts and 5,000 postsecondary
institutions are covered by Title IX). The term “receiving federal financial assistance” has
been broadly interpreted and includes even the receipt of federal financial aid by students
attending an educational institution. See Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 564 (1984)
(Title IX “appears to encompass all forms of federal aid to education, direct or indirect”
(quoting Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 691 (3d Cir. 1982))); Haffer v. Temple Univ.,
688 F.2d 14, 17 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding that because the university “as a whole” received
federal money, “its intercollegiate athletic department” was governed by Title IX).
25.
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a); 34 C.F.R. § 106.1; Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in
Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg.
30,026, 30,097 (May 19, 2020) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106) (“[T]he § 106.45 grievance
process focuses on the purpose of Title IX: to give individuals protections against
discriminatory practices and ensure that recipients provide victims of sexual harassment
with remedies to help overcome the denial of equal access to education caused by sex
discrimination in the form of sexual harassment.”); see also Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441
U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
26.
Paul M. Anderson, Title IX at Forty: An Introduction and Historical Review of
Forty Legal Developments That Shaped Gender Equity Law, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 325,
326 (2012).
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stated, there was a need for Title IX because “one of the great
failings of the American educational system is the continuation of
corrosive and unjustified discrimination against women.”27
At the outset, it is critical to note Title IX’s explicit statutory
implementation scheme for its nondiscrimination mandate is
administrative.28 Of course, those alleging Title IX violations by
educational institutions may file suits in court and obtain the
remedies of injunctive relief, monetary damages, or both. However,
the Supreme Court has held that this implied private right of
action comes with heightened requirements.29 Therefore, DOE
provides the primary enforcement mechanism for Title IX. The
Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights who oversees DOE’s Office for
Civil Rights (OCR) is responsible for interpreting and
implementing Title IX’s requirements.30
A. The Role of the Office for Civil Rights
As the administrative agency with the authority to define,
implement, and monitor Title IX compliance, DOE, through OCR,
issues statements about its Title IX interpretation.31 These

27.
See 118 CONG. REC. 5803 (1972).
28.
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 280 (1998) (“The express
statutory means of enforcement [for Title IX] is administrative . . . .”). “Congress enacted
Title IX in 1972 with two principal objectives in mind: ‘[T]o avoid the use of federal
resources to support discriminatory practices’ and ‘to provide individual citizens effective
protection against those practices.’” Id. at 286 (alteration in original) (quoting Cannon, 441
U.S. at 704).
29.
Id. at 284–85 (“Because the private right of action under Title IX is judicially
implied, we have a measure of latitude to shape a sensible remedial scheme that best
comports with the statute.”); Katharine Silbaugh, Reactive to Proactive: Title IX’s
Unrealized Capacity to Prevent Campus Sexual Assault, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1049, 1058–60,
1062 (2015) (discussing how Title VII jurisprudence informed Title IX remedies in Gebser
and in subsequent OCR Guidance).
30.
See 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.2(d)–.4(a) (giving Assistant Secretary authority to approve
educational institutions for federal funding and determine remedial action for violating
Title IX); see also Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292 (“Agencies generally have authority to promulgate
and enforce requirements that effectuate the statute’s nondiscrimination mandate.”);
RUSSLYNN ALI, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFF. FOR C.R., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER: SEXUAL
VIOLENCE 1 n.1 (2011) [hereinafter SEXUAL VIOLENCE LETTER], https://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y885-ZRUV] (describing Dear
Colleague Letter as “policy guidance” to assist recipients to meet obligations and provide
“the public with information about their rights” under laws and regulations giving rise to
OCR’s legal authority). Title IX’s implementing regulations refer to educational
institutions’ obligation to “eliminate (with certain exceptions) discrimination on the basis
of sex in any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 34
C.F.R. § 106.1.
31.
Title IX and Sex Discrimination, supra note 24; An Overview of the U.S.
Department of Education, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/focus/
what.html [https://perma.cc/MSJ3-DLUN] (last modified May 14, 2018).
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statements provide guidance to schools subject to Title IX
requirements (guidance documents) about how to meet their Title
IX obligations as then-defined by OCR.32 Courts have differed as
to how much deference to afford DOE’s guidance documents, with
some arguing that only those that have complied with the
Administrative Procedure Act33 are entitled to deference.34
OCR has utilized its guidance documents to determine
whether an educational institution is in compliance with Title
IX.35 When OCR determines that an educational institution is not
in compliance with Title IX, it can implement a number of
measures against the educational institution, including:
(1) placing the school under a monitoring period; (2) issuing
requirements to bring the school back into compliance; and
(3) referring the educational institution to the Department of
Justice, which can lead to a revocation of federal funding.36
32.
These guidance documents come in various forms and include, among others,
implementing regulations, guidances, dear colleague letters, question and answer
documents, and resource guides. See, e.g., Request for Information Regarding the
Nondiscriminatory Administration of School Discipline, 86 Fed. Reg. 30,449, 30,449–51
(June 8, 2021) (implementing regulations, dear colleague letters, guidances); SEXUAL
VIOLENCE LETTER, supra note 30 (dear colleague letter); OFF. FOR C.R., U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC., OCR-000112, QUESTIONS & ANSWERS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND SCHOOL
DISCIPLINE (2018) (question and answer document); OFF. FOR C.R., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
OCR-000100, PARENT AND EDUCATOR RESOURCE GUIDE TO SECTION 504 IN PUBLIC
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS (2016) (resource guide).
33.
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559.
34.
See Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for C.R., U.S. Dep’t of
Educ., to the Hon. James Lankford, Chairman, U.S. Senate Subcomm. on Regul. Affs. &
Fed. Mgmt. (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.lankford.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/DEPT.%20of%
20EDUCATION%20LANKFORD%20LETTER%202-17-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/BY7U-X2
FK] (explaining that DOE views dear colleague letters, which have not gone through APA
procedures, as “simply serv[ing] to advise the public” without “force and effect of law”); see
also G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 718–19, 723, 732 (4th
Cir. 2016) (school board banned transgender student from using the boy’s restroom),
vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (mem.); Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 2–
3, Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (No. 16-cv-00054-O) (eleven
states sued DOE arguing that the role of DOE is “to enforce the law of the land, and not
rewrite it by administrative fiat”).
35.
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. 30,026, 30,029 n.11 (May 19, 2020)
(to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106) (“OCR found numerous institutions in violation of Title
IX for failing to adopt the preponderance of the evidence standard in its investigations of
sexual harassment, even though the notion that the preponderance of the evidence
standard is the only standard that might be applied under Title IX is set forth in the 2011
Dear Colleague Letter and not in the Title IX statute, current regulations, or other
guidance.”).
36.
OFF. FOR C.R., CASE PROCESSING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 20–21, 24–25 (“When
post-Letter of Impending Enforcement Action negotiations do not result in a resolution
agreement and OCR decides, within its discretion, to refer the matter to DOJ, it will issue
a letter to the recipient stating that the case will be referred to DOJ within 10 calendar
days of the date of the letter.”).
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B. Educational Institution’s Responsibilities
Educational institutions covered by Title IX must adhere to
fundamental Title IX requirements as they have been delineated
by the caselaw and by OCR. Over time, the Supreme Court
clarified some basic Title IX definitional terms. The definition of
sex discrimination evolved to encompass sexual harassment,
including sexual assault, as prohibited sex discrimination,37 thus
incorporating sexual harassment under OCR’s purview.38 Per
Bostock v. Clayton County,39 a critical Title VII Supreme Court
case to consider in Title IX analysis, the definition of “sex” for
federal civil rights statutes includes biological sex, gender
identity, and sexual orientation.40
Once educational institutions are on notice41 of a potential
Title IX problem or violation, they have a duty to respond, which
includes investigation and, if appropriate, adjudication of the sex
discrimination.42 This response obligation has been the center of
much of the controversy because the 2020 Rule established robust
new procedural requirements for Title IX proceedings and
stringent limits on what schools must and must not investigate.43
37.
See Silbaugh, supra note 29, at 1052–53 (“[W]hen Title VII and Title IX were
passed, that sexual assault or harassment could be framed as sex discrimination wasn’t yet
contemplated.”).
38.
See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. at 30,028–30 (tracing how OCR’s
guidance documents came to incorporate sexual harassment and the importance of its
incorporation into the APA-compliant 2020 Rule).
39.
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
40.
Id. at 1739, 1741; see also Exec. Order 13988, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,023 (Jan. 20, 2021)
(“Under Bostock’s reasoning, laws that prohibit sex discrimination—including Title
IX . . . —prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity or sexual orientation, so
long as the laws do not contain sufficient indications to the contrary.”).
41.
The type of notice the school needs has differed based on the Administration that
is in power. Compare OFF. FOR C.R., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT
GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR
THIRD PARTIES, 12–13 (2001) [hereinafter OFF. FOR C.R., 2001 GUIDANCE] (referring to the
obligation when a “school knows or reasonably should know”), with 34 C.F.R. § 106.30
(stating that notice requires actual knowledge).
42.
See 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.44(a)–.45(b)(1)(iii) (“A recipient with actual knowledge of
sexual harassment in an education program or activity of the recipient against a person in
the United States, must respond promptly in a manner that is not deliberately
indifferent.”). In the past, this obligation has been described differently. See, e.g., OFF. FOR
C.R, 2001 GUIDANCE, supra note 41, at 15 (“Once a school has notice . . . it should take
immediate and appropriate steps to investigate . . . and take prompt and effective steps
reasonably calculated to end any harassment, eliminate a hostile environment if one has
been created, and prevent harassment from occurring again.”).
43.
34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b) (requiring dismissal of formal complaint if conduct “would
not constitute sexual harassment” under 34 C.F.R § 106.30); Complaint for Declaratory &
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Title IX’s enforcement scheme has a strong discipline-based
focus: although Title IX’s promise of equal access to education is
not circumscribed to discipline, over time the focus has trended to
determinations of whether educational institutions have
appropriately effectuated Title IX in their disciplinary processes.44
As scholar Katharine Silbaugh has so eloquently explained, the
story of Title IX is one which has “led to an understanding of sex
discrimination under Title IX that disproportionately pressures
colleges to deliver sex equality primarily by adjudicating assaults
that have already occurred.”45 Silbaugh argued that an effective
Title IX response requires shifting from an adjudication
after-the-fact model to inclusion of a public health prevention
model.46
While I agree with Silbaugh and other scholars that Title IX
obligations should not only be viewed through a limited
disciplinary prism,47 this Article focuses on correctly calibrating
the investigatory process, including the disciplinary system, given
that it has become such an outsized component of Title IX
implementation and enforcement. As such, it is especially critical
that this facet of Title IX becomes aligned with Title IX’s goals.
III. THE PENDULUM SWING: CHANGES IN TITLE IX
INTERPRETATION FROM 2011 TO 2020
A. Brief Background and the Obama Administration
High rates of sexual assault on our nation’s college campuses
are well-documented,48 as is the fact that sexual assault has a
Injunctive Relief at 45, Victim Rts. L. Ctr. v. DeVos, (D. Mass. June 10, 2020) (No. 20-CV11104) (stating that the requirement to dismiss certain complaints “conflicts with the plain
language of Title IX” and “the statute [cannot] be reasonably read to prohibit schools from
addressing any form of sex-based harassment”).
44.
See Silbaugh, supra note 29, at 1064–66.
45.
Id. at 1050.
46.
Id. at 1068, 1073.
47.
See, e.g., JENNIFER S. HIRSCH & SHAMUS KHAN, SEXUAL CITIZENS 258 (2020)
(arguing for a public health model as part of Title IX response); Nancy Chi Cantalupo &
William C. Kidder, Mapping the Title IX Iceberg: Sexual Harassment (Mostly) in Graduate
School by College Faculty, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 850, 858 (2017).
48.
DAVID CANTOR ET AL., ASS’N OF AM. UNIVS., REPORT ON THE AAU CAMPUS
CLIMATE SURVEY ON SEXUAL ASSAULT AND MISCONDUCT vii (2020), https://www.aau.edu/sit
es/default/files/AAU-Files/Key-Issues/Campus-Safety/Revised%20Aggregate%20report%
20%20and%20appendices%201-7_(01-16-2020_FINAL).pdf [https://perma.cc/AZ3C-Q2MX]
(“The overall rate of nonconsensual sexual contact by physical force or inability to consent
since the student enrolled at the school was 13.0 percent . . . .”); see also BONNIE S. FISHER
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number of deleterious effects on a student’s ability to stay in school
and succeed.49 Sexual assault survivors face serious educational
consequences, including but not limited to a negative impact on
grades, the loss of scholarships, and reduced graduation rates.50
These changes have ripple effects with long-lasting consequences:
“Violence—and institutional indifference in its wake—changes the
courses of survivors’ lives, with educational and employment
consequences following them far into the future.”51
By 2013 sexual assault survivors were leading a prominent
wave of activism that emphasized the structural deficiencies in
college responses to sexual assault allegations.52 According to Title
IX activist Lexi Weyrick:
There was a severe lack of diversity in the CARE and CAPS
offices where many students go looking for support after an
assault, administrators clearly did not receive sensitivity
training around the issue, the Title IX office did not follow
the DOE policy, and appeals were only available for
respondents. There were so many things wrong with the
process it was difficult to know where to begin.53

Title IX activists pointed to caselaw, school policies, and survivor
accounts that illustrated schools’ inequitable treatment of Title IX
complainants, including: (1) school employees advising survivors
ET AL.,

U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 182369, THE SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF COLLEGE WOMEN
10 (2000) (finding a sexual assault rate of 27.7 per 1,000 female students); CHRISTOPHER P.
KREBS ET AL., THE CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT (CSA) STUDY xii (2007), https://www.ojp.gov/p
dffiles1/nij/grants/221153.pdf [https://perma.cc/UN6N-36FB] (“Of the [surveyed] women,
28.5% reported having experienced an attempted or completed sexual assault either before
or since entering college.”). See infra Section IV.A for an analysis of how those statistics
have not adequately addressed facets of identity other than biological sex.
49.
KATHARINE K. BAKER ET AL., TITLE IX & THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE:
A WHITE PAPER 1–3 (2017), http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/wp-content/uploads/201
7/07/Title-IX-Preponderance-White-Paper-signed-7.18.17-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7P8-PF
AX].
50.
Id. at 1–2.
51.
Dana Bolger, Gender Violence Costs: Schools’ Financial Obligations Under Title
IX, 125 YALE L.J. 2106, 2118 (2016).
52.
See, e.g., Alexandra Svokos, How Activists Improved the Handling of Campus
Sexual Assault This Year, HUFFPOST, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/campus-sexual-as
sault-progress_n_7470208 [https://perma.cc/H3VS-8C7F] (June 8, 2015) (detailing how
activism of Alejandra Melgoza, Melissa Vasquez, and Lexi Weyrick led to reform of the
University of California, Santa Barbara’s system); see also Brake, supra note 13, at 110,
117 (“Stories of survivors re-victimized by their institutions in the aftermath of reporting
campus sexual assault have sparked a reenergized student activism which found a
receptive audience in the Obama Administration.”).
53.
E-mail from Lexi Weyrick, Boston Univ. Sch. of L., to Naomi M. Mann, Clinical
Assoc. Professor of L., Boston Univ. Sch. of L. (Oct. 12, 2021, 00:11 EDT) (on file with
author).
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to refrain from proceeding with their complaints;54 (2) procedural
imbalances, such as solely respondents having the right to
appeal;55 (3) survivors losing scholarships after the school would
not make academic accommodations that would permit them to
stay in school, such as handing in papers late or dropping a
class-in-common with the respondent;56 (4) retaliation against the
survivor by the respondent or the larger community after making
the complaint, with inadequate or no school response;57
(5) suspension or expulsion of survivors for drinking alcohol in
connection with the sexual assault;58 and (6) survivors being
unable to stay in their school and continue to access their
education.59 Over time, this movement began to also incorporate
larger interest groups.60

54.
Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Burying Our Heads in the Sand: Lack of Knowledge,
Knowledge Avoidance, and the Persistent Problem of Campus Peer Sexual Violence, 43 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 205, 216 (2011); Brake, supra note 13, at 114–15; Moore v. Regents of the Univ.
of Cal., No. 15-CV-05779, 2016 WL 2961984, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2016).
55.
See Cantalupo, supra note 54, at 215; Brake, supra note 13, at 131; see also Claire
Lampen, Ask This Student How Her College Is Protecting Her Rapist, MIC (May 3, 2016), h
ttps://www.mic.com/articles/142089/ask-this-student-how-her-college-is-protecting-her-rap
ist [https://perma.cc/796R-5B2Z].
56.
Cantalupo, supra note 54, at 216; Brake, supra note 13, at 114–16; Carson &
Nesbitt, supra note 21, at 353 (“Adverse educational experiences can directly implicate
survivor’s financial wellbeing. When a survivor’s academic performance declines, they may
lose scholarships, take semesters of leave, drop out, or even be removed from school like
Wanjuki.”); see, e.g., Doe v. Erskine Coll., No. Civ.A. 04–23001RBH, 2006 WL 1473853, at
*7 (D.S.C. May 25, 2006).
57.
See Cantalupo, supra note 54, at 215–16; see, e.g., Rouse v. Duke Univ., 869 F.
Supp. 2d 674, 677–78 (M.D.N.C. 2012) (mem.); Erskine Coll., 2006 WL 1473853, at *7, *13.
58.
See Cantalupo, supra note 54, at 216; see, e.g., Sarah Brown, BYU Is Under Fire,
Again, for Punishing Sex-Assault Victims, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 6, 2018), https://ww
w.chronicle.com/article/byu-is-under-fire-again-for-punishing-sex-assault-victims/ [https://
perma.cc/UK88-8S2X]; Christina Cauterucci, BYU’s Honor Code Sometimes Punishes
Survivors Who Report Their Rapes, SLATE (Apr. 15, 2016, 1:05 PM), https://slate.com/huma
n-interest/2016/04/byu-s-honor-code-sometimes-punishes-survivors-who-report-their-rape
s.html [https://perma.cc/U3UU-544G].
59.
Brake, supra note 13, at 113; see, e.g., Erskine Coll., 2006 WL 1473853, at *7, *13;
Tyler Kingkade, The Woman Behind #SurvivorPrivilege Was Kicked Out of School After
Being Raped, HUFFPOST, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/survivor-privilege-wagatwe-wa
njuki_n_5489170 [https://perma.cc/96XM-RVM2] (June 13, 2014); Phoebe Suy, Sexual
Assault Survivors Share Testimonies, Experiences with Title IX, BAYLOR LARIAT (Nov. 19,
2017), https://baylorlariat.com/2017/11/19/sexual-assault-survivors-share-testimonies-exp
eriences-with-title-ix/ [https://perma.cc/CS4G-52H7]; Audrey Chu, I Dropped Out of College
Because I Couldn’t Bear to See My Rapist on Campus, VICE (Sept. 26, 2017, 11:51 AM), http
s://www.vice.com/en_us/article/qvjzpd/i-dropped-out-of-college-because-i-couldn’t-bear-to-s
ee-my-rapist-on-campus [https://perma.cc/8LLP-5F7N].
60.
By 2016, “[a]dministrators, policymakers, and the general public acknowledged
that ‘sexual violence on campus ha[d] reached epidemic levels.’” Harris & Linder, supra
note 14, at xii (quoting Kate B. Carey et al., Incapacitated and Forcible Rape of College
Women: Prevalence Across the First Year, 56 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 678, 678 (2015)).
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The Obama DOE initially addressed public concern over
sexual assault in schools through the Dear Colleague Letter
guidance document (Dear Colleague Letter) in 2011.61 The Dear
Colleague Letter aimed at addressing the high rates of sexual
violence in schools62 and provided uncharacteristically specific
guidance on how schools should address sexual assault.63 The Dear
Colleague Letter noted that the high rates of sexual violence in
schools were “both deeply troubling and a call to action for the
nation.”64
The Dear Colleague Letter made well-documented changes to
Title IX enforcement and implementation.65 Then-Vice President
Joe Biden noted, “We are the first administration to make it clear
that sexual assault is not just a crime, it can be a violation of a
woman’s civil rights . . . .”66 The Obama Administration
understood that in order to tackle the problem of sexual assault on
campuses, the Administration had to contend with a legacy of lax
DOE enforcement,67 the reluctance of survivors to come forward

61.
SEXUAL VIOLENCE LETTER, supra note 30, at 1.
62.
See id. at 2 & n.3 (citing 2007 report that about one in five women are victims of
completed or attempted sexual assault in college); see also AYA GRUBER, THE FEMINIST WAR
ON CRIME: THE UNEXPECTED ROLE OF WOMEN’S LIBERATION IN MASS INCARCERATION 153
(2020) (describing how OCR’s Assistant Secretary was affected by the CPI Report on rates
of sexual assault in schools).
63.
Robin Wilson, How a 20-Page Letter Changed the Way Higher Education Handles
Sexual Assault, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.chronicle.com/article/ho
w-a-20-page-letter-changed-the-way-higher-education-handles-sexual-assault/ [https://per
ma.cc/JM7E-CCPA] (noting that the “legendary” letter “specif[ied] in fine detail how
colleges should respond to reports of [sexual] assault”).
64.
SEXUAL VIOLENCE LETTER, supra note 30, at 2.
65.
Gersen & Suk, supra note 13, at 900; see also Cantalupo, supra note 13, at 11.
66.
Max Larkin, The Obama Administration Remade Sexual Assault Enforcement on
Campus. Could Trump Unmake It?, WBUR NEWS (Nov. 25, 2016), https://www.wbur.org/20
16/11/25/title-ix-obama-trump [https://perma.cc/LC7V-RRXH].
67.
See Anderson, supra note 13, at 1988 (“[C]olleges and universities do not always
adjudicate allegations of sexual assault well. They have not been adjudicating these kinds
of claims for very long. Since 2011, under the guidance of the Dear Colleague Letter,
campuses have begun to tackle these issues in earnest.”).
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for well-founded reasons68 including institutional betrayal,69 and
the incentives for schools to minimize the problem on their
individual campuses due to the resultant bad publicity.70 While
the Dear Colleague Letter addressed these critical issues via
detailed policies, it did not provide any such suggested policies or
frames for schools to address the complex intersections of identity
and sexual assault on college campuses; indeed, it did not mention
race even once.71
Between 2011 and 2016, the Obama Administration’s Title IX
guidance documents reflected Title IX’s civil rights purpose and
general equality goals and reminded schools that they had a legal
obligation to address sex-based discrimination in their
institutions. These guidance documents prohibited schools from
continuing to provide only one party with procedural rights and
aligned the standard of proof with civil rights statutes through

68.
See supra notes 49–60 and accompanying text (discussing survivor movement and
inequities they alleged); U.S. SENATE SUBCOMM. ON FIN. & CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT,
SEXUAL VIOLENCE ON CAMPUS: HOW TOO MANY INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION ARE
FAILING TO PROTECT STUDENTS 2, 4, 9 (2014) (indicating only about 5% of those who were
sexually assaulted reported it to law enforcement, and schools investigated only a small
portion of the complaints that they received, which even further limited the number of
sexual assaults addressed). These statistics are based on the binary of biological sex and do
not divide by race or other identities, so they do not assist with determining how the rate
could vary when other identities are included.
69.
Carly Parnitzke Smith & Jennifer J. Freyd, Institutional Betrayal, 69 AM. PSYCH.
575, 577 (2014) (“[W]e examine institutional action and inaction that exacerbate the impact
of traumatic experiences—what we call institutional betrayal.”); David L. Stader & Jodi L.
Williams-Cunningham, Campus Sexual Assault, Institutional Betrayal, and Title IX, 90
CLEARING HOUSE 198, 198 (2017) (“In the context of campus sexual assault, institutional
betrayal occurs when a college deliberately or unknowingly causes harm to an individual
who trusts or depends on that institution to keep them safe and treat them fairly.”). Victims
of sexual assault are often retraumatized when their schools discourage reporting, make
reporting difficult, delay adjudication, and cover up sexual assault allegations. See Stader
& Williams-Cunningham, supra, at 198–99. Although institutional betrayal is often
indirect, “victims of institutional betrayal seem to experience the same physical and sexual
ill effects as victims of interpersonal abuse.” Id. at 199.
70.
Cantalupo, supra note 54, at 220 (“[S]chools have incentives not only to remain
unaware of the general problem and specific instances of campus peer sexual violence, but
also to actively avoid knowledge about both.”).
71.
SEXUAL VIOLENCE LETTER, supra note 30, at 1–2 (referring to disability in the
context of capacity to consent and “the likelihood that a woman with intellectual disabilities
will be sexually assaulted is estimated to be significantly higher than the general
population”); see also Kelsey Scarlett & Lexi Weyrick, Transforming the Focus: An
Intersectional Lens in School Response to Sex Discrimination, 57 CAL. W. L. REV. 391, 403
(2021) (“Although the Obama administration’s guidance sought, in part, to remedy the
history of lax sexual assault responses by schools, this guidance still failed to address the
impacts of schools’ traditional focus on protecting white, cisgender, heterosexual male
respondents on marginalized survivors, making it a limited approach.”).
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mandating use of the preponderance of the evidence standard.72
However, they did this without an intersectional focus; a key
weakness in their approach therefore was that it was largely
undifferentiated by consideration of identity.73
For some, the Obama Administration’s changes led to a swift
backlash.74 Opponents of the new approach criticized the Obama
Administration for stacking the deck in favor of the complainants
and trammeling accused students’ due process rights,75 rights they
often inaccurately conflated with those of a defendant in a criminal
case.76 Others, including 116 law professors in a 2017 White Paper,

72.
See SEXUAL VIOLENCE LETTER, supra note 30, at 10–11 (“The Supreme Court has
applied a preponderance of the evidence standard in civil litigation involving discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). Like Title IX, Title VII prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex. OCR also uses a preponderance of the evidence standard
when it resolves complaints against recipients. For instance, OCR’s Case Processing
Manual requires that a noncompliance determination be supported by the preponderance
of the evidence when resolving allegations of discrimination under all the statutes enforced
by OCR, including Title IX. OCR also uses a preponderance of the evidence standard in its
fund termination administrative hearings. Thus, in order for a school’s grievance
procedures to be consistent with Title IX standards, the school must use a preponderance
of the evidence standard (i.e., it is more likely than not that sexual harassment or violence
occurred).” (citation and footnotes omitted)); see also BAKER ET AL., supra note 49, at 7
(“[M]ost college student disciplinary systems have used a preponderance of the evidence
standard for years, and well before the 2011 DCL was released.”). A higher standard such
as “clear and convincing” evidence would violate Title IX as it is “not equitable.” SEXUAL
VIOLENCE LETTER, supra note 30, at 11.
73.
The 2014 Questions and Answers on the Title IX Regulations on Sexual
Harassment made only a few references to identity and included a general note that all
students can be affected without requiring or suggesting any framework to address these
realities. OFF. FOR C.R., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND
SEXUAL VIOLENCE 5 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 Q&A] (noting high rates of sexual harassment
and sexual violence for LGBT youth); id. at 6 (requiring “appropriate training about
working with LGBT and gender-nonconforming students and same-sex violence”); id. at 5
(“Any student can experience sexual violence: . . . male and female students; straight, gay,
lesbian, bisexual and transgender students; part-time and full-time students; students with
and without disabilities; and students of different races and national origins.”).
74.
See Brake, supra note 13, at 110–11 (“[Survivor] stories are increasingly being
countered by oppositional narratives from men alleging that they have been unfairly
accused and too harshly punished for conduct more akin to miscommunication than sexual
assault.”).
75.
Bartholet et al., supra note 16 (listing concerns by twenty-eight Harvard Law
School faculty that Harvard’s procedures to respond to sexual misconduct allegations “lack
the most basic elements of fairness and due process, [and] are overwhelmingly stacked
against the accused”); Emily Yoffe, The College Rape Overcorrection, SLATE: DOUBLE X (Dec.
7, 2014, 11:53 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2014/12/college_rape_c
ampus_sexual_assault_is_a_serious_problem_but_the_efforts.html [https://perma.cc/L9CE
-QCGK] (“Unfortunately, under the worthy mandate of protecting victims of sexual assault,
procedures are being put in place at colleges that presume the guilt of the accused.”); see
also Nancy Gertner, Complicated Process, 125 YALE L.J.F. 442, 443–45 (2016).
76.
Carson & Nesbitt, supra note 21, at 333–34 (“Although ‘due process’ has become
the battle cry of the respondents’ rights movement, the content of that battle cry does not
match the meaning of due process as determined by the courts.” (footnotes omitted)).
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pointed out that the Obama Administration’s enforcement of Title
IX in sexual harassment cases was legally consistent with
previous Administrations’ enforcement, both under Republican
and Democratic presidents, dating back to the mid-1990s.77 Courts
and public opinion were actively grappling with these arguments
when the Trump Administration came into power.78
B. The DeVos Guidance Documents
1. Contours of the Changes. The DeVos DOE aimed its new
rule at addressing its inaccurate narrative of an epidemic of false
or overblown accusations.79 In the words of Candice Jackson,
then-Acting Assistant Secretary of OCR, “the accusations—90
percent of them—fall into the category of ‘we were both drunk,’ ‘we
broke up, and six months later I found myself under a Title IX
investigation because she just decided that our last sleeping

77.
BAKER ET AL., supra note 49, at 10; Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Dog Whistles and
Beachheads: The Trump Administration, Sexual Violence, and Student Discipline in
Education, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 303, 312–13 (2019).
78.
Compare Conor Friedersdorf, The ACLU Moves to Embrace Due Process on Title
IX, ATLANTIC (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/02/aclu-title-i
x/582118/ [https://perma.cc/GLZ5-64E5] (describing support for DOE increasing due
process rules), and Plummer v. Univ. of Hous., 860 F.3d 767, 783 (5th Cir. 2017) (Jones, J.,
dissenting) (“Elevating the standard of proof to clear and convincing, a rung below the
criminal burden, would maximize the accuracy of factfinding.”), with New Poll Finds Broad,
Deep Support for Existing Title IX Sexual Assault Protections, Even Among Trump Voters,
NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. (May 17, 2017), https://nwlc.org/press-releases/new-poll-finds-broad
-deep-support-for-existing-title-ix-sexual-assault-protections-even-among-trump-voters/ [h
ttps://perma.cc/248N-MG2E] (finding support for keeping Title IX rules as they are), and
Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 607 (D. Mass. 2016) (finding that the
preponderance of the evidence standard is “not problematic, standing alone”). See generally
Lee v. Univ. of N.M., 449 F. Supp. 3d 1071, 1130–31 (D.N.M. 2020) (discussing courts
grappling with the standard of proof).
79.
See David Lisak et al., False Allegations of Sexual Assault: An Analysis of Ten
Years of Reported Cases, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1318, 1327–29 (2010) (determining
5.9% of sexual assaults reported to a major northeastern university over a ten-year period
from 1998 to 2007 were false); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible Women: Sexual Violence
and the Credibility Discount, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 8 & n.36, 17–20 (2017) (assessing three
methodologies for determining incidences of false reporting to demonstrate figures—4.5%,
5.9%, and 6.8%, respectively—are significantly lower than estimates provided by law
enforcement officers); see also Dara Lind, What We Know About False Rape Allegations,
VOX (June 1, 2015, 8:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/2015/6/1/8687479/lie-rape-statistics [htt
ps://perma.cc/2K4S-LFE2] (“For one thing, research has finally nailed down a consistent
range for how many reports of rape are false: somewhere between 2 and 8 percent, which
is a lot narrower than the 1.5 percent to 90 percent range of the past.”). For a discussion of
the key methodological issues in assessing incidences of false accusations of sexual assault,
see generally Lisak et al., supra, at 1319–22 and Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive
Relief, supra note 43, at 6, 11–12.
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together was not quite right.’”80 As a result of focusing on
protecting allegedly wrongfully accused respondents and the
unsupported belief that 90% of sexual accusations are of limited
veracity, the 2020 Rule created a set of procedures that are out of
step with the equality mandate of Title IX, the educational context
in which Title IX is implemented, and with other civil rights laws
enforced by DOE. While a fair process is critical to Title IX
disciplinary decision-making, these new procedures are simply not
calibrated to the educational context.
In crafting the 2020 Rule, the DeVos DOE turned to
courtroom-driven models, with an emphasis on using civil and
criminal law courtroom procedures to ensure fairness. As detailed
infra, the assumption that more procedure equals more protection
and more fairness for all respondents, regardless of identity, is
highly problematic.81
Given the breadth of the changes imposed by the 2020 Rule,
Chart One below summarizes and highlights selected major
changes, indicating which changes are linked to a general civil
courtroom model and which changes are linked to a general
criminal model.82

80.
Erica L. Green & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Campus Rape Policies Get a New Look as
the Accused Get DeVos’s Ear, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2017) (emphasis added), https://www.nyt
imes.com/2017/07/12/us/politics/campus-rape-betsy-devos-title-iv-education-trump-candice
-jackson.html [https://perma.cc/CK5W-YSJC].
81.
See infra Section IV.A.
82.
The 2020 Rule sometimes arbitrarily defines the contours of courtroom rights,
and therefore this chart is meant to be illustrative, rather than asserting that every right
contained within it exactly replicates the contours of the rights afforded those in civil or
criminal court. For example, the rules on admissible evidence do not precisely track those
for courtroom rules where the witness is unavailable or does not answer questions.
Compare 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(i) (“If a party or witness does not submit to
cross-examination at the live hearing, the decision-maker(s) must not rely on any statement
of that party or witness in reaching a determination regarding responsibility . . . .”), with
FED. R. EVID. 803 (stating exceptions to the rule against hearsay, including excited
utterance; then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition; and statements made for
medical diagnosis or treatment).
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2. Chart One: Mandatory Adversarial System Changes in
the 2020 Rule
The 2020 Rule

Prior Title IX
Requirement?

Civil
Model?

Criminal
Model?

Mandatory live
hearing.83
Mandatory direct,
live adversarial
cross-examination.84
Decision-maker
required to use
legal system terms
of art during the
investigation and at
a live hearing
including:
inculpatory and
exculpatory
evidence, legally
relevant evidence,
and legally
acceptable contours
for crossexamination
questions at the
hearing.85

83.
§ 106.45(b)(6)(i) (“[P]ostsecondary institutions . . . must provide for a live
hearing.”). K–12 schools have the option of choosing live hearings. Id. § 106.45(b)(6)(ii).
84.
Id. § 106.45(b)(6)(i) (stating that postsecondary institutions “must provide for a
live hearing” and “[s]uch cross-examination at the live hearing must be conducted directly,
orally, and in real time”); cf. 2014 Q&A, supra note 73, at 31 (“OCR does not require that a
school allow cross-examination of witnesses, including the parties, if they testify at the
hearing. But if the school allows one party to cross-examine witnesses, it must do so equally
for both parties.”).
85.
See § 106.45(b)(1)(ii) (explaining that the grievance process must “[r]equire an
objective evaluation of . . . inculpatory and exculpatory evidence”); § 106.45(b)(6)(i)
(explaining that at the live hearing, “[o]nly relevant cross-examination and other questions
may be asked of a party or witness. Before a complainant, respondent, or witness answers
a cross-examination or other question, the decision-maker(s) must first determine whether
the question is relevant and explain any decision to exclude a question as not relevant”).
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The 2020 Rule

Prior Title IX
Requirement?

Civil
Model?

383
Criminal
Model?

Advocate/attorney
for the live hearing
for the respondent
(as well as
complainant)
provided at no
cost.86

87

Criminal definition
of sexual assault.88
The changes in the 2020 Rule have removed the traditional
discretion given to schools in crafting the specifics of their
investigatory process. Previously, schools were permitted latitude
when structuring their investigatory models provided that they

86.
§ 106.45(b)(6)(i) (“[For postsecondary schools], [i]f a party does not have an
advisor present at the live hearing, the recipient must provide without fee or charge to that
party, an advisor of the recipient's choice, who may be, but is not required to be, an attorney,
to conduct cross-examination on behalf of that party.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFF.
FOR C.R., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE TITLE IX REGULATIONS ON SEXUAL
HARASSMENT 21 (July 2021) [hereinafter 2021 Q&A], https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list
/ocr/docs/202107-qa-titleix.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EYV-D9E8] (referring to the obligation on
postsecondary schools to provide advisors). It is not clear if such requirements apply to K–
12 schools who choose the live hearing model.
87.
In the criminal context, an attorney must be provided for an indigent defendant.
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a). There is no comparable provision for the complaining witness. Susan
Kling, Note, A Mandatory Right to Counsel for the Material Witness, 19 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 473, 478–79 (1986). Note that for the Title IX process, the advocate/attorney must
only be provided for the live hearing for purposes of cross-examination and not at prior
stages of the process. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(5)(vi)–(vii), (6)(i) (referring to obligation to
provide advocate or attorney for purposes of cross-examination at a live hearing).
88.
§ 106.30(a)(3). “The term ‘sexual assault’ means an offense classified as a forcible
or nonforcible sex offense under the uniform crime reporting system of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.” 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(1), (6)(A)(v) (stating the definition of sexual assault
that applies to all schools). This definition will sharply exclude from Title IX coverage
categories of sex discrimination that have long been covered by both OCR guidance and
caselaw. For example, it only covers situations where the touching is for the sexual
gratification of the respondent and not where it is, for instance, touching to show power or
sexually humiliate. See, e.g., State v. DiPetrillo, 922 A.2d 124, 126, 135 (R.I. 2007) (referring
to the “Burke analysis of psychological-pressure-on-a-vulnerable-victim” in an employer
sexual assault case); Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003)
(supervisor). See generally Michael Buchhandler-Raphael, Sexual Abuse of Power, 21 U.
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 86, 117–18, 122 (2010); People v. Roa, 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d 604, 609
(2017) (stating that expert witness’s diagnosis of defendant’s sexual sadism was based on
defendant’s “interest in sexually humiliating the victim rather than having sexual
intercourse with her”).
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furthered Title IX and they met the core principles of being
“prompt and equitable.”89 Over time, OCR guidance documents
provided more details on how to implement these principles, such
as ensuring “[a]dequate, reliable, and impartial investigation of
complaints,”90 but schools were nonetheless, in the main,
permitted to structure their procedures in a manner that was
effective for their community. As the 2001 Guidance explained,
“[p]rocedures adopted by schools will vary considerably in detail,
specificity, and components, reflecting differences in audiences,
school sizes and administrative structures.”91 As a result, by the
time of the 2020 Rule, schools were using a variety of models
ranging from the nonadversarial route of having the case handled
by a trained Title IX investigator to use of quasi-courtroom
adversarial models.92
However, under the 2020 Rule, when it comes to sexual
harassment, schools are no longer permitted to use models other
than an adversarial, quasi-criminal courtroom-based model, in
which they are expected to utilize legal yardsticks and terms of
art. There are now mandated courtroom-like procedures and
guidelines intended to create fairness but without the guidance,
training, or infrastructure that enables courts to routinely make
those decisions.
In addition to changing Title IX through mandating use of a
quasi-criminal courtroom model, the DeVos DOE also imposed
additional requirements, separate requirements, or both, on
sexual harassment complainants as compared to those required
for discrimination in education based on other categories and for
other forms of sex-based discrimination. These changes further
move Title IX away from traditional education-based civil rights
laws. Chart Two highlights some of these important new Title IX
requirements and compares them to both prior Title IX standards
and current Title VI ones.

89.
OFF. FOR C.R., 2001 GUIDANCE, supra note 41, at 19 & 36–37 n.98 (explaining
that since Title IX was passed, “[s]chools [have been] required by the Title IX regulations
to adopt and publish a policy against sex discrimination and grievance procedures providing
for prompt and equitable resolution of complaints of discrimination on the basis of sex”).
90.
Id. at 20.
91.
Id.
92.
Naomi M. Mann, Taming Title IX Tensions, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 631, 644–46
(2018) (detailing the general models that schools use).
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Chart Two: The Singling Out of Title IX

Standard in
2020 Rule
Harassment
must be severe,
pervasive, and
objectively
offensive.93
Requirement of
“actual
knowledge” of
the
harassment.96

Old Title IX
Standard

Standard under Title
VI

Harassment must
be severe,
pervasive, or
persistent.94

Harassment must be
severe, pervasive, or
persistent.95

Actual or
constructive
knowledge.97

Actual or constructive
knowledge.98

93.
34 C.F.R. § 106.30(a)(2) (describing the “severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive” standard).
94.
See OFF. FOR C.R., 2001 GUIDANCE, supra note 41, at vi (referring to sexual
harassment as “conduct of a sexual nature is sufficiently severe, persistent, or pervasive”
(emphasis added) (quoting 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,041 (Mar. 13, 1997))); OFF. FOR C.R.,
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OCR-00056, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER: HARASSMENT AND BULLYING
2 (2010) [hereinafter HARASSMENT AND BULLYING LETTER] (explaining that schools are
required to respond to incidents of harassment based on sex, race, ethnicity, national origin,
or disability when conduct is “severe, pervasive, or persistent so as to interfere with or limit
a student’s ability to participate in or benefit from the services”).
95.
See HARASSMENT AND BULLYING LETTER, supra note 94, at 5 (“In this example,
school administrators should have recognized that the harassment was based on the
students’ actual or perceived shared ancestry . . . .”).
96.
See 34 C.F.R. § 106.44(a) (stating that the school must respond when it has
“actual knowledge”); § 106.30(a) (defining what constitutes “actual knowledge”).
97.
OFF. FOR C.R., 2001 GUIDANCE, supra note 41, at 12 (describing the school’s
responsibility “if the school knows or reasonably should know about the harassment”
(footnote omitted)); SEXUAL VIOLENCE LETTER, supra note 30, at 4 (“If a school knows or
reasonably should know about student-on-student harassment that creates a hostile
environment, Title IX requires the school to take immediate action to eliminate the
harassment, prevent its recurrence, and address its effects.”).
98.
Race and National Origin Discrimination: Frequently Asked Questions, OFF. FOR
C.R., https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/frontpage/faq/race-origin.html [https://perm
a.cc/Z3NU-SCSU] (last modified Jan. 10, 2020) (explaining that an educational institution
has a responsibility to take action “[w]hen [it] knows or reasonably should know of possible
racial or national origin harassment”); see also HARASSMENT AND BULLYING LETTER, supra
note 94, at 6 (“Because the school failed to recognize that the incidents created a hostile
environment, it addressed each only in isolation, and therefore failed to take prompt and
effective steps reasonably calculated to end the harassment and prevent its recurrence.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3999428

59 HOUS. L. REV. 363 (2021)

386

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

School must
respond in a
manner that is
not deliberately
indifferent.99

School must
respond with
prompt and
effective action to
end the
harassment and
prevent it from
recurring.100

[59:2

School must respond
with prompt and
effective action to end
the harassment and
prevent it from
recurring.101

Taken together, the changes detailed in the two charts show
how fundamentally the 2020 Rule has reoriented sexual
harassment claims under Title IX. Unlike other civil rights
statutes enforced by DOE, Title IX enforcement of sexual
harassment now requires mandatory use of adversarial
quasi-criminal courtroom models coupled with stringent new
procedural hurdles for complainants to surmount that seriously
limit the conduct that can now be covered under Title IX.
IV. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS
To adequately analyze the changes to the 2020 Rule, it is
critical to understand that they are fundamentally driven by two
core and interrelated concepts. First, rape exceptionalism: the
tradition of imposing different standards on those alleging sexual
assault; and second, a criminal-law based model for procedural
due process in the education context that I call the due process
distortion.102 These ideologies found a voice in the backlash to the
Obama Administration’s Dear Colleague Letter and have become

99.
§ 106.44(a) (explaining that a school “must respond promptly in a manner that is
not deliberately indifferent. A recipient is deliberately indifferent only if its response to
sexual harassment is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances”).
100.
OFF. FOR C.R., 2001 GUIDANCE, supra note 41, at 12 (“As long as the school, upon
notice of the harassment, responds by taking prompt and effective action to end the
harassment and prevent its recurrence, the school has carried out its responsibility under
the Title IX regulations.”).
101.
Race and National Origin Discrimination: Frequently Asked Questions, supra
note 98 (“If an investigation reveals that the harassment created a hostile environment, the
educational institution must take prompt and effective steps reasonably calculated to end
the harassment, eliminate the hostile environment, prevent its recurrence, and, as
appropriate, remedy its effects.”); HARASSMENT AND BULLYING LETTER, supra note 94, at 6.
102.
See supra Section III.A. Other scholars have noted that procedural due process is
sometimes defined in a different manner in the Title IX education context. See, e.g., Wexler,
supra note 21, at 14–15 (describing the nonlegal invocation of due process as “colloquial due
process”); Carson & Nesbitt, supra note 21, at 333–34 (arguing that procedural due process
has been misapplied in the Title IX context).
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more prevalent among scholars and some courts.103 Through the
2020 Rule, these two ideologies take constructions of fairness and
equality in a direction that contradicts Title IX’s goals and aims,
and are misplaced in the education setting.
A. Rape Exceptionalism
Rape exceptionalism, a term developed by scholar Michelle
Anderson, has its roots in criminal law. Rape exceptionalism
posits that the tradition of imposing more onerous requirements
on individuals who allege sexual assault than those who allege
other criminal offenses is a critical component of modern rape
response, notably current treatment of sexual assault on college
campuses. Anderson cautions that this trend is troubling because
“[u]nique hurdles for sexual assault victims and special process
protections for those accused of sexual misconduct are unfair and
harken back to a time when rape victims faced unique hurdles in
criminal prosecution.”104
In the past, survivors of sexual assault had to satisfy
additional criteria, above and beyond those imposed on survivors
of other crimes, before the criminal justice system would credit
their allegations.105 Courts did not consider the survivor’s
testimony, standing alone, sufficient. The testimony had to be
corroborated, survivors had to demonstrate that they had resisted
to the “utmost of [their] physical capacity” during the alleged
assault, and “a cautionary instruction in rape law warned jurors
to treat the complainant’s testimony with skepticism.”106 This
unequal treatment reflected a core belief that survivors, who at
the time were assumed to be White women, were inherently less

103.
See Brake, supra note 13, at 126; Gertner, supra note 75, at 444; Carson &
Nesbitt, supra note 21, at 333–34 (describing critiques of the Obama changes).
104.
See Anderson, supra note 13, at 1998 (referring to “procedural exceptionalism for
campus sexual assault”); id. at 2000 (“[W]e should be skeptical of rape or sexual assault
exceptionalism. The history of attempting to deter legitimate complaints of rape by
imposing unique procedural hurdles is too clear to ignore.”); see also Gertner, supra note
75, at 447 (“Second, the HLS reforms do not represent a return to what Michelle Anderson
has called rape exceptionalism, mirroring ‘the traditional special burdens placed on rape
prosecutions in the criminal law.’” (footnote omitted)).
105.
Anderson, supra note 13, at 1945–59 (describing the history of rape law
requirements in the United States).
106.
Id. at 1943, 1946–47.
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credible.107 Rape exceptionalism is part of survivors’ low
willingness to report108 and the low rate of prosecution.109
Rape exceptionalism has not affected all survivors in the same
manner. Its burdens have always disproportionately and
differentially impacted individuals based on their identities.110 In
this Article, I analyze these impacts primarily through the prism
of race, while fully acknowledging and recognizing that
discrimination occurs among many other axes of identity, such as
class, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity, and other
marginalized identities.111 By acknowledging the differential
impacts of race on rape exceptionalism, I do not mean to imply in
any way that the experiences of women of color can be derived from
the experiences of White women or that White women’s
experiences should be the lens through which we analyze rape
107.
This has also been referred to as the “credibility discount.” Carson & Nesbitt,
supra note 21, at 350 (describing the credibility discount as “society’s baseline disbelief of
women”). Per the style guide followed by the Houston Law Review, racial groups defined by
color are capitalized. MANUAL ON USAGE & STYLE R. 3.01(a), 3.02 (Tex. L. Rev. eds., 15th
ed. 2020); see also Kristen Mack & John Palfrey, Capitalizing Black and White:
Grammatical Justice and Equity, MACARTHUR FOUND. (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.macfou
nd.org/press/perspectives/capitalizing-black-and-white-grammatical-justice-and-equity [ht
tps://perma.cc/F9N6-59ZA] (“Choosing to not capitalize White while capitalizing other
racial and ethnic identifiers would implicitly affirm Whiteness as the standard and norm.”).
108.
See FISHER ET AL., supra note 48, at 23–24 (finding that less than 5% of survivors
of completed or attempted rapes were reported to law enforcement); see also CALLIE
RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 2001: CHANGES 2000–01 WITH
TRENDS 1993–2001 10 (2002), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv01.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3VYN-3BTD] (illustrating the much lower reports of sexual assault in contrast to other
crimes).
109.
See Rape in the United States: The Chronic Failure to Report and Investigate Rape
Cases: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. 247–49 (2010) (statement of Carol E. Tracy, Executive Director, Women’s Law
Project); Megan A. Alderden & Sarah E. Ullman, Creating a More Complete and Current
Picture: Examining Police and Prosecutor Decision-Making When Processing Sexual Assault
Cases, 18 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 525, 540 (2012); Kimberly A. Lonsway & Joanne
Archambault, The “Justice Gap” for Sexual Assault Cases: Future Directions for Research
and Reform, 18 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 145, 153–54 (2012).
110.
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, What About #UsToo?: The Invisibility of Race in the
#MeToo Movement, 128 YALE L.J.F. 105, 111–12, 118–19 (2018) (describing
marginalization and exclusion of women of color from the larger feminist movement in U.S.
society and the #MeToo movement); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV.
1241, 1268 (1991) (describing marginalization of Black women’s sexualization and lack of
media attention on rapes of women of color).
111.
These identities affect how survivors’ vulnerability to, experiences with, and
aftermath from sexual assault intersect in the sexual assault context in especially crucial
ways and how these factors must also be included in a holistic Title IX solution. See
generally INTERSECTIONS OF IDENTITY AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE ON CAMPUS, supra note 14
(analyzing the influence of racism, classism, homophobia, transphobia, ableism, and other
forms of oppression on sexual violence prevention and response strategies); Scarlett &
Weyrick, supra note 71.
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exceptionalism.112 In the eloquent words of Angela Harris, such
essentialism “reduce[s] the lives of people who experience multiple
forms of oppression to addition problems: ‘racism + sexism = straight
black women’s experience,’ or ‘racism + sexism + homophobia = black
lesbian experience.”113 Rather, I hope to add my voice to those
arguing that the experiences of women of color are critical to a full
response to sexual assault in schools and that, these experiences,
to the extent they can be grouped,114 have been marginalized in
dominant discourse, including that around rape exceptionalism.115
The experiences of women and sexual assault have all too
often been framed by the experience of cisgender, heterosexual
White women. In the words of noted scholar Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, the intersection of race and gender highlights
how “the unique form of racialized sexism that women of color face
routinely gets marked as outside of the female experience” because
“the realities of white women’s lives . . . still define the female
experience.”116 Historically, Black,117 Indigenous, and People of
112.
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 581, 602 (1990) (“As in the dominant discourse, black women are relegated to the
margins, ignored or extolled as ‘just like us, only more so.’ But ‘Black women are not white
women with color.’”).
113.
Id. at 588–89.
114.
In using these race-based categories, I do not mean to essentialize any one of these
identities or imply that everyone who is ascribed or self-identifies with any of these
identities is the same. See Frequently Asked Questions: Racial Justice for BIWOC in the
Workplace, MELANIN COLLECTIVE, https://www.themelanincollective.org/faq-racial-justicefor-biwoc-in-the-workplace [https://perma.cc/QEV5-HDE2] (last visited Aug. 19, 2021); see
also Jessica C. Harris, Centering Women of Color in the Discourse on Sexual Violence on
College Campuses, in INTERSECTIONS OF IDENTITY AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE ON CAMPUS,
supra note 14, at 46, 46 (explaining use of the term “women of color,” despite risk of
essentializing, given the importance of the term as a way to build solidarity: “[th]e term
women of color grew out of a movement of resistance and a need for solidarity among a
group of racially minoritized women in the United States” (citing S.M. Roshanravan,
Passing-as-if: Model-Minority Subjectivity and Women of Color Identification, 10
MERIDIANS, Oct. 2009, at 1, 1)).
115.
Harris, supra note 112, at 601 (“Thus, the experience of rape for black women
includes not only a vulnerability to rape and a lack of legal protection radically different
from that experienced by white women, but also a unique ambivalence. Black women have
simultaneously acknowledged their own victimization and the victimization of black men
by a system that has consistently ignored violence against women while perpetrating it
against men.”).
116.
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 110, at 118–19.
117.
The decision to capitalize Black and other marginalized racial identities is a
deliberate one. I capitalize Black and other marginalized racial identities to highlight that
race is a social construct and emphasize how stereotypes about marginalized racial
identities have historically functioned in a discriminatory manner. I also acknowledge that
meanings of race have changed over time as a mechanism of power. See RICHARD DELGADO
& JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 8–9 (2d ed. 2012); Kimberlé
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Color (BIPOC) women,118 especially Black and Indigenous women,
have been targeted and burdened by rape exceptionalism, with the
legal system historically excluding Black women from even having
the right to allege rape.119 The long, violent, and shameful history
of forcibly denying BIPOC women agency over their own bodies
and sexualities is a critical component of the history of sexual
assault in the United States, notably the institution of slavery,
which normalized and legitimized the rape of enslaved Black
women.120
The powerful vestiges of this violent history are apparent in
the clear overlap between marginalized identities and sexual
assault in the few intersectional studies that exist. Researchers
are increasingly studying how individuals with marginalized
identities are vulnerable to sexual assault and reasons for the
increased rates of sexual assault within marginalized
populations.121 The available data in the larger societal context
Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimization
in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) (“When using ‘Black,’
I shall use an upper-case ‘B’ to reflect my view that Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other
‘minorities,’ constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a proper
noun.”). See also supra note 107, explaining that per the style guide followed by the Houston
Law Review, its standard is to capitalize all racial groups defined by color. See MANUAL ON
USAGE & STYLE R. 3.01(a), 3.02 (Tex. L. Rev. eds., 15th ed. 2020).
118.
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
119.
See Jennifer Wriggins, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 103,
106 (1983); Harris, supra note 112, at 598–99; Jason A. Gillmer, Base Wretches and Black
Wenches: A Story of Sex and Race, Violence and Compassion, During Slavery Times, 59 ALA.
L. REV. 1501, 1532 n.221 (2008) (“There is not a single published appellate decision in the
South in the years before the Civil War involving a white man being prosecuted for raping
a black woman. Cf. George v. State, 37 Miss. 316, 317 (1859) (discussing whether it was a
crime for a black man to rape a black woman and holding that it was not).”).
120.
DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION AND THE
MEANING OF LIBERTY 22–31 (1997); Harris, supra note 112, at 598–601 (describing history
of Black women’s vulnerability to rape and lack of legal protection from slavery to twentieth
century); Karen A. Getman, Sexual Control in the Slaveholding South: The Implementation
and Maintenance of a Racial Caste System, 7 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 115, 142 (1984) (“Viewing
rape as an institutional crime critical to the maintenance of slavery still does not present
the full picture, for it does not speak to the Black woman’s daily experience of rape or the
threat of rape.”).
121.
See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 110, at 1243 n.5 (describing statistics about sexual
violence among lesbians); Scarlett & Weyrick, supra note 71, at 410; NAT’L COUNCIL ON
DISABILITY, NOT ON THE RADAR: SEXUAL ASSAULT OF COLLEGE STUDENTS WITH
DISABILITIES 17 (2018), https://ncd.gov/sites/default/files/NCD_Not_on_the_Radar_Accessi
ble.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7XD-G3CN] (explaining that 31.6% of female undergraduate
college students with disabilities report nonconsensual sexual contact involving physical
force or incapacitation compared to 18.4% of female undergraduate students without
disabilities); Robyn Powell, How Betsy DeVos’ Title IX Actions Will Hurt Students with
Disabilities, REWIRE NEWS GRP. (Oct. 24, 2017, 12:57 PM), https://rewirenewsgroup.com/art
icle/2017/10/24/betsy-devos-title-ix-actions-will-hurt-students-disabilities/ [https://perma.c
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show increased vulnerability for BIPOC women and girls,
especially those who are multiracial,122 with heightened
vulnerabilities associated with those who are bisexual and
individuals with disabilities.123
In the educational institution context, there is limited data
regarding the impact(s) of race, gender identity, and sexual
orientation.124 The generally accepted studies, differentiated solely
by binary biological sex and undifferentiated by other identities

c/P22Z-TSVH]; Adrienne Green & Alia Wong, LGBT Students and Campus Sexual Assault,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/09/camp
us-sexual-assault-lgbt-students/406684/ [https://perma.cc/9FRV-W9ZG] (bisexual women
experience “especially disproportionate rates of sexual ‘victimization’”); Laura J.
Blauenstein, Sexual Consent: Perception of Ambiguous Sexual Encounters of LGBTQ+ and
Cisgender, Heterosexual Individuals (Aug. 2018) (manuscript at 38) (M.S.W. thesis,
University of Nevada, Reno), https://scholarworks.unr.edu/bitstream/handle/11714/4526/Bl
auenstein_unr_0139M_12663.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NQD-67H5].
122.
See Nancy Chi Cantalupo, “I Think You Didn’t Get It Because They Misidentified
You as Latina”: A Commentary on Multiracials and Civil Rights: Mixed-Race Stories of
Discrimination, 34 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 39, 41 (2021) (reviewing TANYA KATERÍ
HERNÁNDEZ, MULTIRACIALS AND CIVIL RIGHTS: MIXED STORIES OF DISCRIMINATION (2018))
(“[A] set of distressing, yet rarely discussed, statistics found in the National Intimate
Partner and Sexual Violence Survey (“NISVS”), showing that an average of one-in-two
multiracial women experiences intimate partner or sexual violence in her lifetime, a form
of discrimination that targets multiracial women at higher rates than any other
demographic group in the U.S.”); Cantalupo, supra note 13, at 9 (“[M]ultiracial women
experience sexual harassment 4.8% to 32.2% more than other racial groups of cisgender
men or women . . . .” (citing Matthew J. Breiding et al., Prevalence and Characteristics of
Sexual Violence, Stalking, and Intimate Partner Violence Victimization—National Intimate
Partner and Sexual Violence Survey, United States, 2011, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP., Sept. 5, 2014, at 5, https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/ss/ss6308.pdf [https://perma.cc/2U
KB-FEMT])).
123.
Laura Dorwart, The Hidden #MeToo Epidemic: Sexual Assault Against Bisexual
Women, MEDIUM (Dec. 3, 2017), https://medium.com/@lauramdorwart/the-hidden-metooep
idemic-sexual-assault-against-bisexual-women-95fe76c3330a [https://perma.cc/3G95-KBM
N] (stating bisexual women are three times more likely to be raped than heterosexual
women and more likely to be raped than lesbian women); LEIGH ANN DAVIS, ARC, PEOPLE
WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 1–2 (2011), https://www.thearc.or
g/document.doc?id=3657 [https://perma.cc/4WQJ-SNWN] (“Any type of disability appears
to contribute to higher risk of victimization but intellectual disabilities, communication
disorders, and behavioral disorders appear to contribute to very high levels of risk, and
having multiple disabilities (e.g., intellectual disabilities and behavior disorders) result in
even higher risk levels.”).
124.
Jessica C. Harris & Chris Linder, Introduction to INTERSECTIONS OF IDENTITY
AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE ON CAMPUS, supra note 14, at 1, 1 (“[W]e examined literature about
campus sexual violence in the United States and exposed large gaps in research and
practice, specifically related to historically minoritized students.”); id. at 2 (“[N]o studies
explored predictive factors associated with men’s or trans* students’ experiences with
sexual violence.”); id. at 6–7 (“Few scholars address issues concerning women of color and
sexual violence; moreover, the little that is known is inconclusive. . . . Finally, the
literature, or lack thereof, also points to the dearth of knowledge concerning sexual violence
for women of color who do not identify as (only) Black.”).
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such as race,125 have found that about 20–26% of female students,
23.1% of transgender, genderqueer, and nonconforming students,
and about 6.9% of undergraduate male students have been
sexually assaulted.126 Students with multiple marginalized
identities are even more at risk.127 However, within these
statistics, there are still significant unexplored areas about how
race intersects with these and other marginalized identities in the
education context.
BIPOC female survivors of sexual assault128 have
traditionally been less likely to be believed,129 their cases have
been less likely to be prosecuted,130 and perpetrators of sexual
assault against Black survivors receive lighter criminal

125.
Id. at 5 (explaining that these studies have been problematic as they offer only
the binary choice of “man” or “woman,” and it is unclear whether these categories are
intended to encompass merely biological sex or include other facets such as gender identity).
126.
See CANTOR ET AL., supra note 48, at 80; cf. Harris & Linder, supra note 124, at 6
(“Although a plethora of research examines male students as perpetrators of sexual
violence, minimal research has focused on male students as survivors of sexual violence.”).
127.
Naddia Cherre Palacios & Karla L. Aguilar, An Empowerment-Based Model of
Sexual Violence Intervention and Prevention on Campus (“[S]tudent victims who identify as
transgender, genderqueer, nonconforming, and questioning (TGNQ) report the highest
rates of sexual violence and intimate partner violence, especially those belonging to racial
minorities.” (citation omitted)), in INTERSECTIONS OF IDENTITY AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE ON
CAMPUS, supra note 14, at 194, 200.
128.
The history and definitions of sexual assault must also broaden to recognize the
vulnerabilities associated with identifying with or being viewed as a “woman” or as
“feminine,” even for those who may or may not identify as such. See Sara Matsuzaka &
David E. Koch, Trans Feminine Sexual Violence Experiences: The Intersection of
Transphobia and Misogyny, 34 AFFILIA: J. WOMEN & SOC. WORK 28, 29 (2019) (defining
terms along gender spectrum); see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the
Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47
BUFF. L. REV. 1, 92 (1999) (“In a patriarchal society where masculinity is a source of
privilege, men who deviate from or who are perceived as transgressing from the norm of
masculinity (e.g., gay men or effeminate men), are marginalized and subordinate.” (footnote
omitted)).
129.
See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 110, at 111, 119.
130.
See Harris, supra note 112, at 599; Amii Larkin Barnard, The Application of
Critical Race Feminism to the Anti-Lynching Movement: Black Women’s Fight Against Race
and Gender Ideology, 1892–1920, 3 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J 1, 38 (1993); Chris Linder,
Reexamining Our Roots: A History of Racism and Antirape Activism, in INTERSECTIONS OF
IDENTITY AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE ON CAMPUS, supra note 14, at 63–64; Brittany C. Slatton
& April L. Richard, Black Women’s Experiences of Sexual Assault and Disclosure: Insights
from the Margins, 14 SOCIO. COMPASS, Mar. 12, 2020, at 4 (“Black women face unique
scrutiny when they speak out about their experience(s) of rape. They are perceived as
blameworthy more often than White victims, are ‘less likely to have their cases come to
trial, and less likely to have their trials result in conviction.’” (citations omitted) (quoting
Patricia Hill Collins, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE
POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 147–48 (2d ed. 2000))).
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sentences.131 These are powerful structural barriers blocking
acknowledgment of the sexual harm of Black women and resultant
trauma it creates.132 Studies have shown the many ways in which
Black women are discredited and discounted as sexual assault
survivors:
The belief that Black women are unrapeable continues to
exist. For example, in several studies, researchers asked
college students to respond to hypothetical scenarios that
involved sexual assault. When the victim was a Black
woman, students were less likely to define the incident as
date rape, to believe the crime should be reported to the
police, and to hold the perpetrator accountable. In addition,
students rated a Black date rape victim, when compared to
her White equivalent, as less truthful and more responsible
for her sexual assault. It also appeared that Black rape
survivors were held more responsible for their victimization,
regardless of the perpetrator’s race. These data suggest that
Black women’s long history of sexual victimization, coupled
with
racial
stereotypes,
exacerbated
their
rape
experiences.133

Multiple harmful stereotypes134 about the sexual/bodily
availability and sexuality of different groups of women of color135

131.
Crenshaw, supra note 110, at 1269 (describing a study showing the average
prison term for a man convicted of raping a Black woman was two years, a Latina woman
was five years, and a White woman was ten years).
132.
Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Anthony V. Alfieri, (Re)Framing Race in Civil Rights
Lawyering, 130 YALE L.J. 2052, 2064 (2021) (reviewing HENRY LOUIS GATES, JR., STONY
THE ROAD: RECONSTRUCTION, WHITE SUPREMACY, AND THE RISE OF JIM CROW (2019)) (“The
first lesson is that the white supremacist tropes, narratives, and images of the postbellum
periods of Redemption and Jim Crow segregation continue to frame our legal consciousness
of race. . . . [T]hey also shape the roles, mediate the relationships, and organize the methods
of the lawyering process in civil-rights, poverty-law, and criminal cases.”).
133.
Roxanne Donovan & Michelle Williams, Living at the Intersection: The Effects of
Racism and Sexism on Black Rape Survivors, 25 WOMEN & THERAPY, 2002, at 97 (citations
omitted).
134.
This is a brief discussion of the many stereotypes that have harmed BIPOC
women in the sexual assault context. This discussion is not intended to essentialize any
group of BIPOC women or to imply that any individual experience is captured by them.
135.
Lisa Rosenthal et al., Content of, Sources of, and Responses to Sexual Stereotypes
of Black and Latinx Women and Men in the United States: A Qualitative Intersectional
Exploration, 76 J. SOC. ISSUES 921, 924 (2020) (“Ghavami and Peplau found that
racially/ethnically diverse (but predominantly Asian and white) US undergraduates
identified stereotypes of . . . Black women as well as Latinx women and men as
‘promiscuous.’” (citing N. Ghavami & L.A. Peplau, An Intersectional Analysis of Gender and
Ethnic Stereotypes: Testing Three Hypotheses, 37 PSYCH. WOMEN Q. 113 (2013))).
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contribute to this marginalization136 and erasure.137 These
stereotypes have their roots in the violent histories of colonialism,
occupation, and enslavement.138 For Black women, there are
multiple harmful stereotypes signifying promiscuity and
availability.139 Native-American women have been stereotyped as
being “sexually depraved.”140 Asian-American women have been
136.
Harris, supra note 114, at 55 (“Once again, the narratives of women of color are
central to identifying and exposing oppressive structures that affect their experiences,
specifically with sexual violence.” (citation omitted)).
137.
Many have written about the erasure of BIPOC women in movements for social
change, even where BIPOC women have played a large role in creating that change. This
was prominent in the #MeToo movement where Alyssa Milano, a White actress, at first was
given credit for the #MeToo movement when in fact it had been created a decade earlier by
activist Tarana Burke, a Black woman. See Alanna Vagianos, The ‘Me Too’ Campaign Was
Created by a Black Women 10 Years Ago, HUFF. POST (Oct. 17, 2017, 1:44 PM), http://www.h
uffingtonpost.com/entry/the-me-too-campaign-was-created-by-a-black-woman-10-years-a
go_us_59e61a7fe4b02a215b336fee [https://perma.cc/NZ7F-T8FS]. For analysis into the
marginalization of Black feminists in historical feminist movements, see Linder, supra note
130, at 66–67, describing how mainstream White feminists consistently ignore Black
women’s sexual violence organizing in 1970s.
138.
Katherine Giscombe, Sexual Harassment and Women of Color (Blog Post),
CATALYST (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.catalyst.org/2018/02/13/sexual-harassment-andwomen-of-color [https://perma.cc/CY3P-82SN] (describing how history of European
colonization of Latin America, U.S. occupation in Asian countries, and slavery gave rise to
stereotypes of women of color).
139.
Crenshaw, supra note 110, at 1279 (“Jurors were less likely to believe in a
defendant’s guilt when the victim was [B]lack. . . . [J]urors . . . were influenced by
stereotypes of [B]lack women as more likely to consent to sex or as more sexually
experienced and hence less harmed by the assault.”); Donovan & Williams, supra note 133,
at 97–98 (“The Jezebel image is typically projected onto women who are perceived to be
sexually promiscuous, lustful, and immoral. This stereotype can potentially be applied to
women of all ethnic backgrounds; however, when race is considered, this image is often
associated with Black women.”). This stereotype has its roots in the oppression and violence
against Black women during slavery. See ROBERTS, supra note 120, at 10–11 (noting that,
“[f]rom the moment they set foot in this country as slaves, Black women have fallen outside
the American ideal of womanhood,” and “[t]he myth of the lascivious Black woman was
systematically perpetuated after slavery ended”); supra notes 119–20 and accompanying
text (describing history of rape & slavery).
140.
Alexandra (Sandi) Pierce, “Sexual Savages:” Christian Stereotypes and Violence
Against North America’s Native Women, in RELIGION AND MEN’S VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 63, 63 (Andy J. Johnson ed., 2015); Sarah Deer, Toward an Indigenous
Jurisprudence of Rape, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 121, 125 (2004) (noting history of treating
Native-American women differently under law because of “view[] [of] Native women as
immoral and therefore unworthy of protection”). These stereotypes emerged under the
colonial system to define Native-American women as threats to order. See Pierce, supra, at
63. Discriminatory laws continue to hamper sexual assault prosecutions of rapes of
Native-American women. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-167R, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DECLINATIONS OF INDIAN COUNTRY CRIMINAL MATTERS 3 (2010)
(finding that U.S. Attorneys Offices “declined to prosecute . . . 67 percent of sexual abuse
and related matters” referred to their offices for prosecution from Native-American
reservations), https://www.gao.gov/assets/100/97229.pdf [https://perma.cc/EMR5-6JJT];
RONET BACHMAN ET AL., VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE WOMEN
AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE: WHAT IS KNOWN 38 (2008) (finding that 57% of rape
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viewed as submissive, exotic, and erotic by nature.141 Latina142
women have been stereotyped and portrayed as “hot [and] overly
sexual”143 while also being “perceived as readily available and
accessible for sexual use.”144
In fact, “each subgroup of women of color can point to
intersectional stereotyping of their group as prostitutes or
promiscuous.”145 These stereotypes render women of color
vulnerable to sexual violence in the first instance and interact with
rape exceptionalism in especially damaging ways that operate to
normalize sexual violence against women of color.146

and sexual assault victimization against American-Indian and Alaska-Native women was
committed by White offenders in 1992–2005), www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/223691.pd
f [https://perma.cc/K5TL-RUPS].
141.
See Sumi K. Cho, Converging Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment:
Where the Model Minority Meets Suzie Wong, 1 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 177, 191 (1997)
(“Asian Pacific women suffer greater harassment exposure due to racialized ascriptions (for
example, they are exotic, hyper-eroticized, masochistic, desirous of sexual domination,
etc.).”); Rachel Kuo, How Rape Culture and Racism Combine to Hurt Asian Women,
EVERYDAY FEMINISM (Jan. 2, 2017), https://everydayfeminism.com/2017/01/rape-culture-ra
cism-asian-women/ [https://perma.cc/57CF-P7XT] (“[S]tereotypes leveraged against East
Asian women have been normalized, just like rape culture. These tropes can be found in
representations in media, comments that harass us sexually and racially, and ways we’re
constructed via laws and policy.”). These sexualized stereotypes of Asian women are further
reinforced by the “model minority myth” of Asian Americans, which brings together blanket
assumptions about groupwide assimilationist success and presumptions of “political
passivity and submissiveness to authority.” Cho, supra, at 185. See generally Sunny Woan,
White Sexual Imperialism: A Theory of Asian Feminist Jurisprudence, 14 WASH. & LEE J.
C.R. & SOC. JUST. 275 (2008) (examining how sexual violence by White men against Asian
women results directly from legacy of Western imperialism in Asia).
142.
Latina women may also be subject to different and compounded stereotypes based
on their racial identification. Although the nuanced distinction between race and ethnicity
deserves more attention, for purposes of this Article I include the Latinx community within
discussions of racial minorities and Black, Indigenous, and People of Color (BIPOC).
143.
Waleska Suero, Comment, “We Don’t Think of It as Sexual Harassment”: The
Intersection of Gender & Ethnicity on Latinas’ Workplace Sexual Harassment Claims, 33
CHICANA/O–LATINA/O L. REV. 129, 143 (2015); see Maria L. Ontiveros, Three Perspectives on
Workplace Harassment of Women of Color, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 817, 820 (1993)
(“[S]ociety considers Latinas naturally sexual . . . evoking the image of the ‘hot-blooded’
Latin.”). The history of violence and rape against Latina women traces back to the
European colonization of Latin American countries. See Giscombe, supra note 138.
Additionally, “Latina bodies have long been fetishized, ‘sexualized and eroticized’ in the
United States and in Europe.” Suero, supra, at 142–43 (quoting Isabel Molina Guzmán &
Angharad N. Valdivia, Brain, Brow, and Booty: Latina Iconicity in U.S. Popular Culture, 7
COMMC’N REV. 205, 211 (2004)).
144.
Ontiveros, supra note 143, at 820. Within the Latinx community, Latina women
are stereotyped as “sensual and sexually responsive” in order to “satisfy [their] hot-blooded,
passionate [Latino] partner[s].” See Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas by
Latino Males: An Analysis of Race, National Origin, and Gender Differentials, 14 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 231, 240–41 (1994).
145.
Cantalupo, supra note 13, at 17.
146.
Giscombe, supra note 138.
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Kelsey Scarlett, a Title IX activist, noted:
These stereotypes function to establish who is able to be
raped and who is not. Fundamentally, they essentialize who
is allowed to be a survivor. For women with marginalized
identities, stereotypes act to dehumanize their identities,
eradicating the individual and establishing a monolith. They
replicate patterns of thinking that sexual assault only counts
for certain groups of women, that a marginalized woman is
only an experience not a person. These racialized and
gendered stereotypes about women of color have serious
negative impacts on their ability to seek assistance, to be
believed, and for their agency to be recognized. The longer
these stereotypes continue to be disregarded or go
unaddressed, the more validated respondents are in
believing that they are doing nothing wrong when they
sexually assault women of color.147

Racial discrimination compounds with sex discrimination to create
complex interlocking barriers to justice for BIPOC female
survivors of sexual assault, and this pattern of discrimination
within discrimination remains strong today.
Men of color, whether as complainants148 or as respondents,
are also harmed by racialized gender stereotypes,149 and it is
necessary to recognize and consider the full implication of both
individuals’ races within this context.150 Through the work of
147.
E-mail from Kelsey Scarlett, Boston Univ. Sch. of L., to Naomi M. Mann, Clinical
Assoc. Professor of L., Boston Univ. Sch. of L. (Oct. 8, 2021, 16:35 EDT) (on file with author).
148.
Gwen Aviles, Terry Crews: Black Men Not Recognized as Victim ‘Until We’re
Dead,’ NBC NEWS (June 8, 2020, 10:22 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/terrycrews-black-men-not-recognized-victims-until-we-re-n1225636 [https://perma.cc/YM24-WS
7H] (discussing how Black men “[ha]ve always been seen as a threat” despite experiences
of sexual assault and victimization).
149.
Cantalupo, supra note 13, at 11 (noting that the criminal law model used in Title
IX “has relied on racialized sex stereotyping of both women of color and African American
men to a significant extent”). For analysis into gendered effects of sexualized stereotypes
on different racial groups, see Hutchinson, supra note 128, at 79–80, stating, “While each
marginalized racial group has a unique history of sexualized racial oppression, they share
a similar history of racial hierarchy executed by sexual repression and violence.
Furthermore, white supremacist culture has assigned a battery of sexual stereotypes to
each marginalized racial group . . . .” and id. at 81–96, discussing sexualized stereotypes of
Black, Latinx, and Asian American men and women.
150.
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 110, at 108–09 (“[R]ecognizing the
multidimensional nature of discrimination and subordination is critical because solutions
to one form of subordination cannot be provided ‘without analyzing how [the subordination]
is affected and shaped by other systems of domination.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: ‘Intersectionality,’ ‘Multidimensionality,’ and
the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 308
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Athena D. Mutua151 and Darren Hutchinson,152 among others,
multidimensionality theory153 has illustrated how “individuals
whose identities meet at the intersection of privilege and
disadvantage—for example, male and black—may encounter
unique forms of discrimination and subordination, depending
upon context.”154 While being male is typically associated with
privilege,155 dominant narratives stereotype Black men as violent
(2001))). It is important to consider the perpetrator’s race and how that impacts societal
responses to sexual assault, as this country’s cultural and legal understanding of rape was
influenced by a history of Black men who were lynched following false accusations of sexual
harassment and violence against White women. See Maureen Downey, Opinion: Rolling
Back Title IX Threatens Racial and Gender Justice, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (May 6, 2020), https
://www.ajc.com/blog/get-schooled/opinion-rolling-back-title-threatens-racial-and-gender-ju
stice/HLXwfxxBt4Xm9jyNKsUuDL/ [https://perma.cc/P7KZ-RHZ3]. However, recognizing
discrimination against perpetrators of color cannot come at the expense of Black survivors,
“who must both confront racial bias and challenge their status as instruments, rather than
beneficiaries, of the civil rights struggle [for Black men].” Crenshaw, supra note 110, at
1277 (“Black women are considered victims of discrimination only to the extent that white
men can rape them without fear of significant punishment. Rather than being viewed as
victims of discrimination in their own right, they become merely the means by which
discrimination against Black men can be recognized.”).
151.
See Athena D. Mutua, Multidimensionality Is to Masculinities What
Intersectionality Is to Feminism, 13 NEV. L.J. 341, 345–47, 355–56, 358–59 (2013)
(describing the development of multidimensionality theory to analyze “partially privileged
identities” as a response, in part, to perceived limitations of intersectionality). However,
due to intersectionality as “a powerful metaphor and analytical framework that has
matured and gone global” since its original theory, Mutua notes that “much of what can be
analyzed by employing the multidimensionality framework can also be analyzed through
intersectionality theory.” Id. at 342.
152.
See Hutchinson, supra note 128, at 81–83 (“The sexualized oppression directed at
blacks, given a patriarchal social structure, has produced gendered effects—creating
different experiences for black men and black women.”).
153.
Multidimensionality “is a framework that guides analysis of patterns and
interactions between complex hierarchical systems ‘and the social identity categories
around which social power and disempowerment are distributed.’” Mutua, supra note 151,
at 354 (quoting Hutchinson, supra note 150, at 309). For discussion of the five tenets of
multidimensionality as articulated by Mutua, see id. at 355 n.79. Ann C. McGinley and
Frank Rudy Cooper further boil these five insights down into two principles: “(1) identities
are co-constituted and (2) identities are context-dependent.” Ann C. McGinley & Frank
Rudy Cooper, Identities Cubed: Perspectives on Multidimensional Masculinities Theory, 13
NEV. L.J. 326, 334 (2013) (“A multidimensional approach argues that since identities are
co-constituted, race, gender, class, sexual orientation, and other discrete identities are
actually intertwined within one another and cannot be understood in isolation. . . . A
multidimensional approach also argues that the meanings of discrete identities, even when
understood in light of their co-constituted nature, interact differently in different
settings.”).
154.
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 110, at 108.
155.
However, this narrative ignores those who do not fit the traditional category of
“male.” See Hutchinson, supra note 128, at 92 (“In a patriarchal society where masculinity
is a source of privilege, men who deviate from or who are perceived as transgressing from
the norm of masculinity (e.g., gay men or effeminate men), are marginalized and
subordinate.”); see also Mutua, supra note 151, at 345–46 (“[T]he interpretation of black
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and sexually dangerous—stereotypes that also have their roots in
slavery and were reinforced through centuries of racism.156 As
Henry Louis Gates Jr. detailed, stereotypes of Black men have
been “refigured as the congenitally inveterate rapist, projected
onto black male human beings, trapped by their ‘nature’ in a
permanent state of lust, poised to violate, unpredictably and
spontaneously, the purity and sanctity of white virginal
womanhood.”157
This dynamic has been studied in the criminal sexual assault
context and reveals that the defendant’s race vis-à-vis the victim
affects the outcome in criminal sexual assault cases. When
defendants of color commit the “intra-racial crime of sexual
assault” they face more lenient treatment than White
defendants.158 An important corollary is that “defendants of color
who were accused of primarily inter-racial crimes were treated
more harshly.”159
In addition to in the criminal system, structural racism plays
an important documented role in inequitable discipline in K–12
schools.160 In the college context, we do not know enough about this
men as privileged by gender and oppressed by race appeared incorrect in our observations
of racial profiling . . . [and] did not capture the harsher treatment black men seemed to face,
not only in the context of anonymous public space that often characterized racial profiling,
but also in terms of higher rates of hyper incarceration, death by homicide and certain
diseases, suicide rates, and high unemployment as compared to black women.”).
156.
Onwuachi-Willig & Alfieri, supra note 132, at 2056–61 (describing the interaction
between Philando Castile and Police Officer Yanez: “In the end, Yanez saw what society
had taught him to see in black people and, in this instance, black men: danger. Yanez saw
defiance and a disregard for the rules from a man known for his careful attention to
instruction and directions. And, in turn, Yanez felt what society had shown him to feel in
response: trepidation and fear.”); Hutchinson, supra note 128, at 81 (“In America’s racially
hierarchical society, black men are constructed as promiscuous, threatening to white
women and as possessing an unmatched sexual prowess.”); id. at 82–83 (describing how
lynchings were justified by the view that Black male heterosexuality was a violent threat
to white women, even where rape was not alleged).
157.
GATES, supra note 132, at 146.
158.
Cantalupo, supra note 13, at 16.
159.
Id. (citing Christopher D. Maxwell et al., The Impact of Race on the Adjudication
of Sexual Assault and Other Violent Crimes, 31 J. CRIM. JUST. 523, 526–27, 533–34 (2003));
see, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 110, at 1275–76 (summarizing studies that found Black men
accused of raping White women were treated more harshly than Black offenders accused of
raping Black women).
160.
Travis Riddle & Stacey Sinclair, Racial Disparities in School-Based Disciplinary
Actions Are Associated with County-Level Rates of Racial Bias, 116 PNAS 8255, 8255 (2019)
(“[B]lack students are more likely to be seen as problematic and more likely to be punished
than white students are for the same offenses.”); Matthew C. Fadus et al., Racial Disparities
in Elementary School Disciplinary Actions: Findings from the ABCD Study, 60 J. AM. ACAD.
CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 998, 1003 (2021) (“Systemic racism, as well as explicit
individual racism and unconscious biases, likely play a role in the disciplinary process of
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intersection because there is limited data on identity in Title IX
sexual assault claims.161 This is in part because educational
institutions use the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(FERPA) and other legal protections to redact the names and
identifying information of both parties.162 This intersection must
be studied because it is critical to determine how race interacts
with sexual assault procedures in educational institutions.
Increased protections for respondents generally are not
guaranteed to translate to the protection of all respondents,
notably those that are men of color.163 Without an explicit
consideration of race, such a system could continue to replicate
bias and discrimination.
Further, the rights of complainants and respondents of color
are not necessarily oppositional in theory164 or in practice,165 and
in fact can operate as a false dichotomy that can erase women of

children; studies have shown that Black children are more often incorrectly judged to be
older and less innocent-appearing than peers, are misconceived as insubordinate and
aggressive, and are therefore treated as though they require less comfort . . . .”).
161.
Cantalupo, supra note 13, at 73 (discussing the lack of research regarding the
race of male respondents in colleges); cf. Ben Trachtenberg, How University Title IX
Enforcement and Other Discipline Processes (Probably) Discriminate Against Minority
Students, 18 NEV. L.J. 107, 124, 127 (2017) (noting that colleges do not collect data on the
intersections of discipline and race).
162.
Brake, supra note 13, at 144–45 (“To date, there is no data on the racial impact
of campus discipline for sexual assault, which is itself problematic.”); Cantalupo, supra note
77, at 309 (“In fact, the campus proceedings used to resolve complaints of sexual
harassment are overwhelmingly nonpublic and therefore provide almost no actual data
about the demographics of campus sexual harassment.”); Commonly Requested FERPA
Records, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR., https://splc.org/commonly-requested-ferpa-records/ [http
s://perma.cc/2J83-ZJVE] (last visited Sept. 13, 2021) (explaining that while FERPA
“expressly exempts and does not prohibit disclosure of the final results of disciplinary
proceedings against students who committed serious crimes, including sex crimes[,]”
educational institutions still use FERPA as a reason to deny the disclosure of student
information regarding sexual assaults).
163.
See Brake, supra note 13, at 144 (“The risk that OCR’s Title IX enforcement will
over-police men of color is very real given that school discipline overall, like criminal law
enforcement, is marred by racial disparities—a problem OCR itself has highlighted in its
enforcement efforts under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”).
164.
Athena D. Mutua, The Multidimensional Turn: Revisiting Progressive Black
Masculinities, in MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH 78, 80
(Frank Rudy Cooper & Ann C. McGinley eds., 2012) (describing the Progressive Black
Masculinities project as inclusive of combatting patriarchy and sexism in addition to racism
as it “rejects arrangements that depend on the subordination and oppression of others”).
165.
See Ruth Lawlor, How the Trump Administration’s Title IX Proposals Threaten
to Undo #MeToo, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/201
9/02/04/how-trump-administrations-title-ix-proposals-threaten-undo-metoo [https://perma.
cc/6DZX-FP79] (“In reality, however, the changes simply roll back protections for sexual
assault victims, while doing nothing to actually address the issue of racial bias in rape
cases. This is because the proposed changes center on a false dichotomy, one that frames
civil rights for men of color and protections for rape victims as a zero-sum game.”).
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color as survivors.166 As Kimberlé Crenshaw has pointed out, “[t]he
primary beneficiaries of policies supported by feminists and others
concerned about rape tend to be white women; the primary
beneficiaries of the Black community’s concern over racism and
rape, Black men.”167 The concern, as Crenshaw elaborates, is that
recognizing discrimination against perpetrators of color cannot
come at the expense of Black survivors, “who must both confront
racial bias and challenge their status as instruments, rather than
beneficiaries, of the civil rights struggle [for Black men].”168 The
goal is to create fair systems for all complainants and respondents,
which necessarily encompasses the concept that any fair system
must be one in which a student does not face race-based
discrimination, whether as a complainant or a respondent.
The complex interconnection between race and Title IX
enforcement is shown by the correlation between the rise in
concern over respondents’ rights169 at the same time that more
robust Title IX enforcement started to encompass investigations
against a larger number of White male students:
As Title IX has extended beyond athletics . . . public
sympathy for the college men accused of sexual assault has
grown, as have concerns about unfounded accusations. Just
as racial assumptions have driven the harsh condemnation
of paradigmatic rapes, so have they fueled sympathy for men
of race and class privilege who are accused of sexual assault
but who do not fit the prototype.170

166.
See, e.g., Cantalupo, supra note 77, at 319–21 (describing how the dominant
narrative of the White female complainant and the Black male respondent serves to
obfuscate the power dynamics in Title IX implementation, which privilege White male
cisgender respondents and erase women of color as complainants); id. at 319 (“Because the
narrative presents all complainants as white women and all accused students as black men,
it treats women of color as invisible, even when women of color are actually complainants.”).
167.
Crenshaw, supra note 110, at 1269.
168.
Id. at 1277.
169.
I do not intend to assert that all of those concerned about respondents’ rights have
been prompted solely by concern about White respondents. Scholars have raised important
concerns about how structural racism within college disciplinary systems would impact
respondents of color. See, e.g., Aya Gruber, Rape Law Revisited, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 279,
296–97 (2016) (cautioning the increase of state carceral power and university disciplinary
authority because of implications for marginalized individuals); I. Bennett Capers, The
Unintentional Rapist, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1345, 1367 (2010) (“[I]n attempting to eradicate
sexism in rape laws, feminist scholars have entrenched an approach to analyzing rape
allegations that is, if not overtly racist, very much racialized.”).
170.
Brake, supra note 13, at 148; cf. Cantalupo, supra note 77, at 311 (describing how
the due process focus in the DeVos DOE was “part of a campaign by a number of coordinated
groups . . . to undermine the rights of not only harassment victims but also those accused
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DOE’s 2020 Rule implements a number of criminal-law based
assumptions and implicates racialized gender/gendered race
stereotypes about sexual assault. These assumptions fail to
account for how the identities of both complainants and
respondents could factor into a fair system that is compliant with
Title IX.
The changes in the 2020 Rule must be viewed in conversation
with rape exceptionalism and its underlying assumptions about
the nature of sexual assault, including credibility and which party
in a sexual assault case deserves protection, a notion which itself
often turns on the identities of survivors and respondents.171 After
all, the DeVos DOE explicitly signaled that it believed core tenets
of rape exceptionalism, including questioning the veracity of those
who allege sexual assault.172 These beliefs are directly reflected in
the higher burdens placed on complainants in Title IX cases than
on complainants under other civil rights statutes enforced by DOE
and even other forms of sex discrimination covered by Title IX.173
B. The Due Process Distortion
Rape exceptionalism and the push for quasi-courtroom
models have found a home in a criminal-law based model for
procedural due process in the educational context that I call the
due process distortion. The due process distortion argues for
criminal law-based procedural due process rights in the sexual
students who are overwhelmingly African American. . . . [I]t seeks to convince the public
that dismantling Title IX protections for sexual harassment victims will better protect
students of color’s due process rights, while distracting attention from Trump officials’ quiet
dismantling of Obama-era efforts to stop disproportionate school discipline of black
students”).
171.
See Cantalupo, supra note 77, at 320–21 (detailing how dominant narratives
regarding complainant and respondent identities affect how they are treated by educational
institutions in the Title IX context); Brake, supra note 13, at 139 (recognizing there is a
“clash of narratives” between student survivors and accused students and “[w]hichever
story is most salient and comes foremost to mind has an outsized power to shape public
policy”); Harris & Linder, supra note 14, at xiii–xiv (discussing how archetypal survivors
are seen as “[s]tereotypically pretty, apparently white, cisgender, heterosexual women” and
“Black male athletes [are seen] as perpetrators”).
172.
Green & Stolberg, supra note 80 (reporting that Candice Jackson referred to 90%
of sexual assault accusations as being suspect); Alanna Vagianos, Devos: ‘I Don’t Know’
Whether Sexual Assaults Outnumber False Accusations, HUFFPOST, https://www.huffpost.c
om/entry/devos-i-dont-know-whether-sexual-assaults-outnumber-false-accusations_n_5aa
67531e4b086698a9f9fa4 [https://perma.cc/6WFY-QQSP] (Mar. 13, 2018).
173.
2021 Q&A, supra note 86, at 31 (“The 2020 amendments explain that the
grievance process required for formal sexual harassment complaints does not apply to
complaints alleging discrimination based on pregnancy, different treatment based on sex,
or other forms of sex discrimination.” (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.45 (which specifically refers to
the processes as those for “formal complaints of sexual harassment”))).
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assault context that are most commonly linked to three separate,
yet intertwined, propositions. These propositions hold that
criminal due process is required in all schools, whether or not the
due process clause actually applies to them,174 because of: (1) the
criminal nature of the conduct underlying the accusation against
the respondent;175 (2) the charge’s very serious potential
consequences,176 including expulsion, which is the highest

174.
See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (providing that neither the state nor the federal
government shall deprive any person “of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law”). The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause applies only to state action,
meaning that only state schools, and not private schools, are covered by its requirements.
See Plummer v. Univ. of Hous., 860 F.3d 767, 773 (5th Cir. 2017) (explaining that “due
process requires notice and some opportunity for hearing . . . at a tax-supported college”
(quoting Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961))).
175.
See, e.g., J. Brad Reich, When Is Due Process Due?: Title IX, “The State,” and
Public College and University Sexual Violence Procedures, 11 CHARLESTON L. REV. 1, 22
(2017) (describing sexual violence procedures at public colleges and universities as
“different” from other disciplinary proceedings “because the information gathered in
campus procedures may well be used against the alleged offender in the criminal justice
system”).
176.
It is important to note here some statistics about the formal Title IX process,
including how many cases actually impose sanctions. Only about 25% of cases that are
reported are adjudicated through the formal Title IX process. See Tara N. Richards, No
Evidence of “Weaponized Title IX” Here: An Empirical Assessment of Sexual Misconduct
Reporting, Case Processing, and Outcomes, 43 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 180, 187 (2019). Of
those that are formally adjudicated, less than half resulted in a finding of responsibility,
and less than half of adjudications resulting in findings of sexual misconduct resulted in
suspension or expulsion for responsible party. Id. Of students found responsible for sexual
misconduct, 28.57% were suspended and 18.49% were expelled. Id.; see also Tyler
Kingkade, Fewer Than One-Third of Campus Sexual Assault Cases Result in Expulsion,
HUFFPOST, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/campus-sexual-assault_n_5888742 [https://per
ma.cc/VFF2-DXC5] (Dec. 6, 2017) (“Students found responsible for sexual assault were
expelled in 30 percent of cases and suspended in 47 percent of cases, according to The
Huffington Post’s review of data collected from nearly three dozen colleges and
universities.”); Nick Anderson, Colleges Often Reluctant to Expel for Sexual Violence—with
U-Va. a Prime Example, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/loca
l/education/colleges-often-reluctant-to-expel-for-sexual-violence—with-u-va-a-prime-exam
ple/2014/12/15/307c5648-7b4e-11e4-b821-503cc7efed9e_story.html [https://perma.cc/9DX6VYGQ].
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sanction that a school can impose;177 and (3) the presumed
reputational impacts of sexual assault allegations.178
To be sure, some form of procedural due process applies in
public schools when the state (through the public schools) acts in
a way that could deprive an individual of life, liberty, or
property.179 Courts differ on the source of due process rights in the
Title IX context for post-secondary schools,180 with some holding
that it stems from a liberty interest181 and others basing it on a
property interest.182
The nature of the underlying interest to be protected is a
critical factor when determining what procedural rights are due in
any given context. Unlike many other constitutional rights,
procedural due process rights are not fixed or rigid. “They are
fact-dependent and context-specific.” They attach according to the
“nature of the deprivation at stake”; “the greater the potential
deprivation of rights the greater the process that must be
provided.”183

177.
Carson & Nesbitt, supra note 21, at 333 (“[T]he most severe outcome of a campus
case is expulsion.”). Even when students are expelled, they may not face serious
repercussions for their conduct. See Kenny Jacoby, A Football Star Was Expelled for Rape
Twice. A Secret Deal Scrubbed It from His Transcript, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.co
m/in-depth/news/investigations/2019/12/12/oregon-ducks-player-accused-rape-plays-differ
ent-ncaa-school/4366387002/ [https://perma.cc/RD2U-CM4X] (Dec. 16, 2019, 11:09 AM)
(noting how a student expelled for rape—twice—was then able to play NCAA football at
another school because of a “confidential deal” facilitated by the DeVos DOE); Cantalupo,
supra note 77, at 333 & n.143 (describing anecdotal evidence of cases where students found
responsible for sexual assault were not expelled and were able to transfer schools).
178.
Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393, 399 (6th Cir. 2017) (“[A]llegations of
sexual assault may ‘impugn [a student’s] reputation and integrity, thus implicating a
protected liberty interest.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Doe v. Cummins, 662 F. App’x
437, 445 (6th Cir. 2016))); Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 582 (6th Cir. 2018) (“Being labeled a
sex offender by a university has both an immediate and lasting impact on a student’s life.
The student may be forced to withdraw from his classes and move out of his university
housing. His personal relationships might suffer. And he could face difficulty obtaining
educational and employment opportunities down the road, especially if he is expelled.”
(citations omitted)).
179.
See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
180.
The right was not disputed in the K–12 context given the right to public education
for those grade levels. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573–74 (1975) (asserting that
students “plainly had legitimate claims of entitlement to a public education” in the K–12
context as state statute provided it).
181.
See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Conn., No. 20CV92, 2020 WL 406356, at *3 (D. Conn.
Jan. 23, 2020); Doe v. Rector of George Mason Univ., 132 F. Supp. 3d 712, 723–24 (E.D. Va.
2015); Doe v. Alger, 175 F. Supp. 3d 646, 657–60 (W.D. Va. 2016) (finding liberty and
property interests); Plummer v. Univ. of Hous., 860 F.3d 767, 773 (5th Cir. 2017); Univ. of
Cincinnati, 872 F.3d at 399.
182.
See, e.g., Doe v. Pa. State Univ., 336 F. Supp. 3d 441, 446–47 (M.D. Pa. 2018);
Messeri v. Univ. of Colo., No. 18-CV-2658, 2019 WL 4597875, at *9 (D. Colo. Sept. 23, 2019).
183.
Mann, supra note 92, at 646, 667–68.
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Schools cannot imprison students; at most, they can expel
them. Thus, the procedures that should be required by due process
when one is accused of sexual assault in the educational setting
are vastly different than when one is accused of sexual assault in
a criminal court.184 Procedural due process provides protections
calibrated to the deprivation that the state actor185 is seeking: “At
most, the educational institution’s sanction is to deny the student
the ability to continue his education at that particular educational
institution. . . . Simply put, a disciplinary hearing at an
educational institution is not a criminal trial and thus criminal
[due process] protections are not mandated.”186
The primary procedural due process argument in the Title IX
educational context is that, “given the serious (and potentially
criminal) nature of sexual assault allegations, the procedural due
process protections of a criminal trial, with its full panoply of
rights and protections, including adversarial cross-examination
and representation by counsel, should be utilized in the
educational setting.”187 Put another way, this deceptively simple
argument is that because sexual assault is potentially criminally
punishable, fairness requires that those accused of sexual assault
in an educational setting be provided with the rights and
protections afforded to a defendant in a criminal trial. This
proposition ignores the reality that schools “do not convict people
of crimes, impose criminal sanctions, or award damages.”188
Further, scholar Nancy Chi Cantalupo has expertly detailed,
in a compelling series of articles, the multiple harms that flow

184.
Id. at 652; Carson & Nesbitt, supra note 21, at 333 (“Whereas the most severe
outcome of a campus case is expulsion, the deprivation of a property and a minimal liberty
interest, criminal cases can result in a complete loss of liberty through incarceration.”).
185.
These rights have often been asserted in popular discourse as applicable to
private educational institutions. See Bartholet et al., supra note 16 (stating that the
then-existing policies at Harvard, a private educational institution, lack “the most basic
elements of fairness and due process”). However, federal constitutional procedural due
process protections do not attach where there is no state actor. Cf. Plummer, 860 F.3d at
773.
186.
Mann, supra note 92, at 652; see also Carson & Nesbitt, supra note 21, at 333
(“Whereas the most severe outcome of a campus case is expulsion, the deprivation of a
property and a minimal liberty interest, criminal cases can result in a complete loss of
liberty through incarceration.” (citations omitted)).
187.
Mann, supra note 92, at 634.
188.
Letter from Ted Mitchell, President, Am. Council on Educ., to Suzanne B.
Goldberg, Acting Assistant Sec’y, Off. for C.R. 3 (June 10, 2021) [hereinafter ACE Letter],
https://www.acenet.edu/Documents/Comments-ED-OCR-Title-IX-Hearing-061021.pdf [htt
ps://perma.cc/AT8N-U8DR].
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from using the criminal model in the educational setting.189 First,
“[t]his conflation fundamentally undermines Title IX’s central
purpose: to protect and promote equal educational opportunity for
all students, including both the alleged perpetrators and the
victims of gender-based violence.”190 Use of a criminal model shifts
the focus from the protection of all students to the protection of the
student accused of wrong-doing.191 Second, the criminal model
allows for an imbalance in rights afforded to complainants and
respondents.192 Given the power of the state and the possibility of
loss of life or liberty through incarceration,193 and the serious
collateral consequences of a criminal conviction (such as the
necessity of registering as a sex offender, restrictions on voting
rights, restrictions on the right to possess a firearm, or a
combination), the criminal system rightly focuses on providing
procedural protections for the accused.194 Third, the criminal
model provides a different set of mandated requirements,
including the standard for the burden of proof,195 that are not
consistent with the civil model routinely used for—and more
appropriate for—civil rights violations.196
189.
See, e.g., Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Keynote Speech, Title IX & the Civil Rights
Approach to Sexual Harassment in Education, 25 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 225, 228
(2020) (noting that quasi-criminalization of Title IX undermines protection for victims
because it shifts “focus from the rights of the discrimination victim to the rights of the
accused harasser”); Cantalupo, supra note 77, at 325 (arguing that criminalization of civil
rights law impedes its equality function because the goals of the criminal justice system
conflict with civil rights goals). This Article focuses on the harms related to this analysis of
the 2020 Rule.
190.
Nancy Chi Cantalupo, For the Title IX Civil Rights Movement: Congratulations
and Cautions, 125 YALE L.J.F. 281, 284 (2016).
191.
See, e.g., Cantalupo, supra note 77, at 331 (“Those seeking to criminalize Title IX
insist that only the criminal standards of proof are fair to accused students, an argument
showing in and of itself that criminalization proponents are not concerned about the rights
of all students but simply with those of accused students. However, if one considers all
students, then it quickly becomes clear that the . . . preponderance standard comes closest
to treating both parties equally.” (emphasis omitted)).
192.
See Cantalupo, supra note 77, at 228.
193.
See supra Section III.A on procedural due process for a fuller analysis of this
point.
194.
Cantalupo, supra note 190, at 284–85 (“[T]he criminal system is primarily focused
on the defendant’s, not the victim’s, rights.”).
195.
Brake, supra note 13, at 133–34 (arguing that raising the standard of proof in
Title IX adjudications from preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence
“expresses skepticism of complainants’ stories by insisting on extra assurance that the
presumptively unexpected outcome is the truthful one”).
196.
See SEXUAL VIOLENCE LETTER, supra note 30, at 10–11 (explaining why
preponderance of the evidence is consistent with discrimination practice and that a higher
standard such as clear and convincing evidence would violate Title IX as it is “not
equitable”); see also BAKER ET AL., supra note 49, at 9–10 (explaining why preponderance
of the evidence is the only equitable standard).
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The due process distortion conflates the potential criminality
of sexual assault with the need for criminal law due process in the
entirely different setting of a school disciplinary proceeding. The
punishments, including collateral consequences, in each of these
settings are qualitatively different in kind and scale and therefore
demand very different levels of procedural due process.197 In the
school setting, the highest possible sanction is expulsion, which is
not a common result of a report of sexual misconduct.198 Where
expulsion is imposed, the broader consequences are typically more
circumscribed than in the criminal context due to FERPA and
other laws protecting students’ disciplinary records and the fact
that student disciplinary records are not inquired about as a
matter of course in the same way that criminal records are.199 By
contrast, in a criminal sexual assault case, collateral consequences
are more widespread: a conviction can implicate defendants’ right
to vote and right to possess firearms, affect their ability to get
employment, affect their ability to get public housing, and
defendants could be required to register as sex-offenders, which
often circumscribes where defendants can live and work.
It is critical that schools provide fair systems given the
important rights at stake for complainants200 and respondents.201
However, internal school Title IX disciplinary proceedings are
connected to a different set of consequences than criminal
prosecution and the procedures can, and should, be calibrated to
that context.
The due process distortion also alters the fundamental nature
of the “what process is due” inquiry by tying it to the alleged
conduct that the individual is accused of, rather than the proper
focus on the potential deprivation at stake.202 Proponents of the
197.
See Carson & Nesbitt, supra note 21, at 333; Mann, supra note 92, at 667.
198.
See supra note 176 and accompanying text; Carson & Nesbitt, supra note 21, at
333.
199.
See supra note 162 and accompanying text. Employment applications, licensures,
and housing applications, to name a few, often inquire about criminal records.
200.
See supra Section III.A.
201.
See sources cited supra note 178.
202.
Whiting v. Univ. of S. Miss., 451 F.3d 339, 344 (5th Cir. 2006) (“The requirements
of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” (quoting Bd. of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 566–67 (1972))); Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 582 (6th Cir. 2018) (“Being
labeled a sex offender by a university has both an immediate and lasting impact on a
student’s life. The student may be forced to withdraw from his classes and move out of his
university housing. His personal relationships might suffer. And he could face difficulty
obtaining educational and employment opportunities down the road, especially if he is
expelled.”).
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due process distortion argue that this is warranted because
accusations of sexual assault, even in the education context, are
assumed to carry the possibility of serious reputational harm for
the respondent and therefore require quasi-criminal procedural
due process protections.203 This reputational harm argument
inappropriately focuses on reputational effects for the respondent,
rather than on both students204 as is appropriate in Title IX. In
addition, the alleged harm is qualitatively different than in the
criminal context. In the school disciplinary context, FERPA and
other statutes protect students’ confidential disciplinary
information from the general public, and this information is not
commonly required, for example, in employment and housing
applications. In the criminal context, a conviction for sexual
assault is often public record and can be a part of routine inquiries
for employment and housing, and therefore be available to a
broader section of the community. In both contexts, there is
potential reputational harm, and procedural due process
calibrates the protection to the harm.
The potential for reputational harm is an important
consideration for any fair system to weigh. In the procedural due
process context, the legal argument flowing from the concern
about special reputational harm due to an accusation of sexual
assault has been addressed under the “stigma plus” argument.
Overall, that line of argument has been rejected in the Title IX
context205 and others.206 For example, in Doe v. Alger, the
respondent argued the school violated his procedural due process
rights when the school noted on his transcript that he had been

203.
See supra note 178 and accompanying text; Michael Powell, Trump Overhaul of
Campus Sex Assault Rules Wins Surprising Support, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2020), https://w
ww.nytimes.com/2020/06/25/us/college-sex-assault-rules.html [https://perma.cc/Q4SL-8UU
6].
204.
See Cauterucci, supra note 58 (explaining how BYU’s policy marginalized and
retaliated against survivors); Carson & Nesbitt, supra note 21, at 322 (survivors face a
multitude of harms as a result of campus sexual assault); see, e.g., Doe v. Erskine Coll., No.
8:04–23001RBH, 2006 WL 1473853, at *7, *11 (D.S.C. May 25, 2006) (where school’s
internal investigation determined male perpetrator was “very bright, very intelligent, and
going places,” survivor of sexual assault suffered significant reputational harm when she
became known as “rape girl” on campus and subsequently attempted to commit suicide).
205.
See Messeri v. Univ. of Colo., No. 18-CV-2658, 2019 WL 4597875, at *20–21 (D.
Colo. Sept. 23, 2019); Winter v. Pa. State Univ., 172 F. Supp. 3d 756, 765–66 (M.D. Pa.
2016); Doe v. Rector of George Mason Univ., 132 F. Supp. 3d 712, 722 (E.D. Va. 2015).
206.
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (the caselaw “does not establish the
proposition that reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as
employment, is either ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ by itself sufficient to invoke the procedural
protection of the Due Process Clause”).
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disciplined for a conduct code violation involving sexual assault.207
He argued that this stigma would harm his reputation, limiting
his educational and employment opportunities in the future.208
The court acknowledged there was reputational harm but held
that this did not mandate a different level of constitutional
protection in public postsecondary schools:
The standard established in Paul, which has come to be
known as “stigma plus,” requires a reputation injury (the
stigma), accompanied by a state action that distinctly altered
or extinguished a legal status or right (the plus). . . . [T]he
test after Paul is not one of the level of sting to the stigma or
the severity of the consequences; rather, if there is stigma,
then the court must also determine whether there is also the
“plus”—a legal right or status that was altered or
extinguished. . . . [O]utside of the employment context, Paul
instructs that there must be a statutory right that was
altered or extinguished . . . . [T]here is no statutory right to
be a public college or university student.209

There is no question that there are potential reputational
consequences for respondents in school sexual assault disciplinary
cases. However, these potential reputational consequences, or
stigma, do not automatically lead to criminal due process
protections as a matter of constitutional law in the education
context. Accordingly, because there is no constitutional basis for
criminal due process protections in this context, a fair disciplinary
process should incorporate these consequences into a thoughtfully
calibrated system210 without importing criminal law procedures
into the education setting.
Notably, the due process distortion has centered on Title IX
sexual harassment, and only on Title IX sexual harassment. Many
of those most actively arguing for quasi-criminal procedural due
process in schools are doing so only in the context of Title IX sexual
assault proceedings and not for other school disciplinary
proceedings that address potentially criminal activity such as
207.
Doe v. Alger, 175 F. Supp. 3d 646, 655 (W.D. Va. 2016) (plaintiff “allege[d] that
he ha[d] a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his good name”).
208.
Id. (plaintiff argued that the notation would “substantially limit or foreclose both
future educational and employment opportunities”).
209.
Id. at 660.
210.
See, e.g., Mann, supra note 92, at 670–72; Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Civil Rights
Investigations and Comprehensive Prevention of Sexual Misconduct, in ADJUDICATING
CAMPUS SEXUAL MISCONDUCT AND ASSAULT: CONTROVERSIES AND CHALLENGES 91, 94–95,
97 (Claire M. Renzetti & Diane R. Follingstad eds., 2019).
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drug-related activity and simple assault.211 Additionally,
proponents do not argue for the same level of process for
disciplinary cases in which a student could potentially face the
same disciplinary sanctions as for sexual assault.212 Nor are they
suggesting it for other types of conduct that could also impose
stigmatizing or reputational consequences, such as plagiarism or
race-based discrimination.213 These due process arguments are
inextricably linked to qualms about the veracity of sexual assault
complainants. This is a classic example of rape exceptionalism:
treating complainants differently because of the nature of the
harm they are alleging.214
V. PRINCIPLES
The misplaced focus on rape exceptionalism and the due
process distortion has led to the transformation of “classrooms into
courtrooms.”215 The 2020 Rule has imposed a mandatory
quasi-criminal courtroom regime on schools’ internal investigatory
and disciplinary Title IX processes for sexual harassment cases
that is detrimental to a school’s ability to meet its Title IX
obligations and continue to function as a primarily educational
institution.216
In the investigatory context, the 2020 Rule departs from the
fundamental understanding that our nation’s colleges are meant
to function as educational institutions rather than as
quasi-criminal courts of law. The 2020 Rule has deleterious
impacts not only on Title IX enforcement but also on educational
institutions.217 Further, these changes set Title IX apart from
211.
Anderson, supra note 13, at 1985–86.
212.
Id. at 1986 & n.254.
213.
Id. at 1985–86.
214.
See id. at 2000 (“The history of attempting to deter legitimate complaints of rape
by imposing unique procedural hurdles is too clear to ignore.”).
215.
Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393, 400 (6th Cir. 2017) (the university “is
not required to ‘transform its classrooms into courtrooms’ in pursuit of a more reliable
disciplinary outcome” (quoting Jaksa v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 597 F. Supp. 1245, 1250
(E.D. Mich. 1984))).
216.
See, e.g., ACE Letter, supra note 188, at 2–3 (describing the negative impacts of
the 2020 Rule on schools’ ability to meet Title IX); McKenzie Javorka & Rebecca Campbell,
“This Isn’t Just a Police Issue”: Tensions Between Criminal Justice and University
Responses to Sexual Assault Among College Students, 67 AM. J. CMTY. PSYCH. 152, 158
(2021) (“As a result of this emphasis on criminal justice responses, participants noted that
universities may be failing to protect the civil and educational rights of survivors . . . .”).
217.
ACE Letter, supra note 188, at 3 (“These legalistic and counterintuitive
requirements have made it more difficult for campuses to prevent and address sexual
assault, protect survivors, and treat both parties fairly and equitably.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3999428

59 HOUS. L. REV. 363 (2021)

410

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[59:2

enforcement of other federal civil rights anti-discrimination
statutes and from other forms of sex discrimination under Title IX.
In fact, in the name of Title IX, the 2020 Rule imposes unequal
burdens on those alleging sexual harassment, undermining the
central purpose behind Title IX.
The following principles can guide DOE and educational
institutions in returning to policies that effectuate Title IX’s
purpose. With the advent of the Biden/Harris Administration,
there is opportunity to return to the goals of Title IX and
implement a fair standard that is attuned to educational
institutions, accounts for how sexual assault impacts their
communities—notably those with marginalized identities—and
returns the focus to the equality goals of Title IX.
A. Principle One: Classrooms Not Courtrooms
Educational institutions are, at base, learning communities.
As learning communities, they focus on creating environments and
structures that are conducive to meeting their educational goals.
They create a set of rules and codes of conduct that students and
community members are required to abide by as a condition of
remaining in good standing. These rules are typically not punitive
in nature218 but rather intend to keep the community both safe and
focused on its educational mission.219
Educational institutions are not courts of law.220 They do have
the authority and the responsibility to determine whether a
community member has engaged in conduct that has either
violated clearly expressed internal codes of conduct and standards
or implicated anti-discrimination laws, such as Title IX, and to
determine what the consequence should be, if any.221
218.
Id. (“[T]he Regulations are antithetical to the fundamental educational nature
and objectives of campus student disciplinary processes. Campuses can best respond to
allegations of sexual assault by using processes that are part of, or at least align with, their
institutional student codes of conduct. These codes do not, as a first priority, seek to
punish.” (emphasis omitted)).
219.
Id. (noting that the 2020 Rule impedes the objectives of campus student
disciplinary processes, which includes protecting survivors).
220.
Id. at 2 (“Colleges and universities are not civil or criminal courts, nor should they
be.”).
221.
Carson & Nesbitt, supra note 21, at 333 (“Campus codes of conduct allow schools
to adjudicate cases of arson, assault, and theft because, as courts have long recognized,
schools have the right to discipline conduct—including conduct constituting a crime—that
interferes with the educational environment or undercuts the institution’s legitimate
pedagogical goals.”); ACE Letter, supra note 188, at 1 (“Higher education institutions
understand that they have a clear, unambiguous responsibility under Title IX to promptly
and effectively respond to allegations of sexual harassment, including sexual assault.”).
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The 2020 Rule’s disciplinary rules are a significant departure
from both prior practice and caselaw. Courts typically carefully
defer to educational institutions when they are acting within their
educational role to protect their community:
Educational institutions are entitled to deference when they
are exercising their authority to make operational decisions,
including maintaining discipline. Discipline and adherence
to community standards are part of the educational process,
and therefore educational institutions are well-suited to
implement these goals. As such, educational institutions
have broad authority to make and implement their rules,
provided that they don’t conflict with other laws, including
constitutional law. This deference is appropriate given that
education has historically been the province of the state
government and courts are therefore reluctant to
intervene.222

Courts are careful to protect educational institutions from turning
into extensions of the court system. As the Court in Goss
explained, “Brief disciplinary suspensions are almost countless. To
impose in each such case even truncated trial-type procedures
might well overwhelm administrative facilities in many places
and, by diverting resources, cost more than it would save in
educational effectiveness.”223 Through the 2020 Rule, DOE is
directly mandating the importation of a quasi-criminal,
courtroom-based process rather than permitting schools to develop
systems compliant with Title IX principles that are also suited to
their community.
Educational institutions are uniquely situated with respect to
addressing the problem of sexual assault. Schools have legal
obligations under Title IX and are often the sole actor able to offer
complainants the remedies that enable them to fully access their
educational experience. It is precisely this unique orientation that
makes the preservation of the school’s Title IX role so critical. The
recent effort to import quasi-criminal courtroom procedures and
standards into schools threatens this role and reduces the

222.
Mann, supra note 92, at 650 (footnotes omitted).
223.
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975); see also Raul Romero, Comment, An
Erroneous Shift in Perspective: How Cross-Examinations Forsake Constitutional
Jurisprudence and the Purpose of Title IX, 53 TEX. TECH L. REV. 377, 412 (2021) (“Due to
the cost and administrative challenges schools will face in implementing, not only crossexamination, but all the procedural protections that come with a trial, this proposition
would be almost unrealistic.”).
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likelihood that complainants will receive the remedies they need
to retain their equal access to education.224
Survivors of sexual assault and sexual harassment often turn
to educational institutions because unlike the civil or criminal
court
systems,225
these
educational
institutions
are
community-based methods to achieve their goals, including
staying in school.226 Students often come forward because they are
seeking safety for themselves and the larger community, rather
than wanting the respondent to face criminal charges.227
School-based remedies are available to student complainants
through accessing the school’s internal systems, including the

224.
ACE Letter, supra note 188, at 3 (“These legalistic and counterintuitive
requirements have made it more difficult for campuses to prevent and address sexual
assault, protect survivors, and treat both parties fairly and equitably.”); cf. Letter from Nat’l
Educ. Ass’n to Brittany Bull, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. 1 (Jan. 30, 2019), https://downloads.re
gulations.gov/ED-2018-OCR-0064-17760/attachment_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/QDZ5-Y6E4]
(arguing that, in the K–12 context, the then-proposed Rule would “drastically scale back
schools’ ability to address sexual harassment”).
225.
In the civil context, the potential remedy is usually monetary, which does not
address or remedy the harm the survivor has experienced or enable them to keep accessing
their education on an equal basis. See Alexandra Willingham, Note, Opening the Door:
Expanding Civil Redress for Sexual Assault Through Fraternity Insurance, 72 STAN. L. REV.
1717, 1727–28 (2020) (discussing civil remedies). In the criminal context, it is society, not
the survivor, who is seen as the plaintiff/victim and the remedy is focused on punishing the
respondent, which again does not provide the survivor with what they need to continue to
equally access their education. See Carson & Nesbitt, supra note 21, at 333; Why Schools
Handle Sexual Violence Reports, KNOW YOUR IX, https://www.knowyourix.org/issues/school
s-handle-sexual-violence-reports/ [https://perma.cc/DLW3-UTNA] (last visited Sept. 15,
2021); Kelly Alison Behre, Ensuring Choice and Voice for Campus Sexual Assault Victims:
A Call for Victims’ Attorneys, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 293, 326 (2017) (“Victims of sexual assault
often do not define justice in the way that aligns with the criminal justice system.”).
226.
Mann, supra note 92, at 640. Under the 2020 Rule, any measures that affect the
respondent may be instituted by the school only after a finding under the grievance process.
34 C.F.R. § 106.44(a); Judith Lewis Herman, Justice from the Victim’s Perspective, 11
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 571, 574 (2005) (“The wishes and needs of victims are often
diametrically opposed to the requirements of legal proceedings. Victims need social
acknowledgement and support; the court requires them to endure a public challenge to their
credibility. Victims need to establish a sense of power and control over their lives; the court
requires them to submit to a complex set of rules and bureaucratic procedures that they
may not understand and over which they have no control. Victims need an opportunity to
tell their stories in their own way, in a setting of their choice; the court requires them to
respond to a set of yes-or-no questions that a break down any personal attempt to construct
a coherent and meaningful narrative.”).
227.
ACE Letter, supra note 188, at 3 (explaining that the purpose of codes of conduct
are not to punish but rather to focus on a fair resolution and the impact on the community);
ALL. FOR SAFETY & JUST., CRIME SURVIVORS SPEAK 24 (2016), https://allianceforsafetyandju
stice.org/wp-content/uploads/documents/Crime%20Survivors%20Speak%20Report.pdf [htt
ps://perma.cc/927X-U23C] (displaying data that serious crime survivors would prefer
prosecutors to focus on solving community problems rather than focusing on convictions).
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student code of conduct and disciplinary mechanisms.228 The
process can range from informal (contacting individual professors
for accommodations) to formal (making an official complaint to the
Title IX Coordinator or filing a complaint through the Title IX
code).229
Schools can most directly, and often exclusively, provide
education-related remedies, including a combination of: waiving
requirements to allow the complainant to change classes without
penalty; allowing complainants to move their residence
off-schedule; providing education-related accommodations, such
as extensions on course assignments; or requiring that
respondents stay away from complainants, change class, or move
their residence.230 Students are entitled under Title IX to seek
these school-specific remedies in order to continue to equally
access their education without sex-based discrimination.231
Title IX does not mandate that schools’ procedures mirror
those of a courtroom, and students who request assistance are not
seeking a court-like process. Instead, schools are expected to
create a fair process to maintain their own educational focus
consistent with their community that also meets the standards of
fairness that are so central to Title IX.232
228.
Carson & Nesbitt, supra note 21, at 333 (“Campus codes of conduct allow schools
to adjudicate cases of arson, assault, and theft because, as courts have long recognized,
schools have the right to discipline conduct—including conduct constituting a crime—that
interferes with the educational environment or undercuts the institution’s legitimate
pedagogical goals.” (footnote omitted)); SEXUAL VIOLENCE LETTER, supra note 30, at 8
(“Therefore, a recipient may use student disciplinary procedures or other separate
procedures to resolve such complaints. . . . Grievance procedures generally may include
voluntary informal mechanisms (e.g., mediation) for resolving some types of sexual
harassment complaints.”).
229.
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. 30,026, 30,097 (May 19, 2020) (to be
codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106) (“[T]he § 106.45 grievance process leaves recipients with wide
discretion to utilize informal resolution processes.”).
230.
Mann, supra note 92, at 640. Under the 2020 Rule, schools cannot take measures
that affect the respondent until the conclusion of the grievance process. See 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.45(b)(1)(i) (schools must follow “a grievance process that complies with this section
before the imposition of any disciplinary sanctions or other actions that are not supportive
measures as defined in § 106.30, against a respondent”).
231.
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. at 30,274 (“The final regulations
revise another provision, § 106.45(b)(1)(i), to specify that remedies designed to restore or
preserve equal access to the recipient’s education program or activity may include the same
individualized services described in § 106.30 ‘supportive measures,’ but that remedies need
not be non-disciplinary or non-punitive and need not avoid burdening the respondent.”).
232.
ACE Letter, supra note 188, at 1 (“Higher education institutions understand that
they have a clear, unambiguous responsibility under Title IX to promptly and effectively
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By contrast, the 2020 Rule mandates an explicitly adversarial
model requiring schools to change their fundamental orientation
towards student disciplinary procedures while simultaneously
learning a whole new set of legal adversarial skills.233 The 2020
Rule adopted the most adversarial model for questioning evidence
in the form of live cross-examination and requires schools to use
it.234 The rigidity of the system prevents schools from using their
knowledge of their communities to investigate and to craft
responsive disciplinary policies.235
While courts have long warned against turning classrooms
into courtrooms,236 the 2020 Rule is nonetheless transforming
school-based investigations of Title IX sexual harassment
allegations into quasi-criminal legal trials. The 2020 Rule requires
schools to change their educational investigatory models to that of
a courtroom hearing, develop trial-like disciplinary systems, and
employ advocates for students, which will require a cascade of
changes to how schools structure and conduct their investigatory
processes.237
In order to meet the requirements of the 2020 Rule, schools
will either have to require their nonlegal employees to conduct
these quasi-criminal courtroom proceedings or deputize in-house
legal counsel or hired attorneys to conduct them. Should a school
choose to utilize its nonlegal employees, it will have to train those
employees on such issues as the fine points of legal relevance,
distinctions that characterize both criminal and civil trials and are
respond to allegations of sexual harassment, including sexual assault. . . . Doing so requires
policies and procedures that are appropriate for the particular institution . . . .”); see also
OFF. FOR C.R, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT
OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES 20 (2001)
(“[Grievance] [p]rocedures adopted by schools will vary considerably in detail, specificity,
and components, reflecting differences in audiences, school sizes and administrative
structures, State or local legal requirements, and past experience.”).
233.
34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b).
234.
Id. § 106.45(b)(6)(i).
235.
ACE Letter, supra note 188, at 1–3.
236.
Jaksa v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 597 F. Supp. 1245, 1250 (E.D. Mich. 1984)
(“While a university cannot ignore its duty to treat its students fairly, neither is it required
to transform its classrooms into courtrooms.”).
237.
See, e.g., ACE Letter, supra note 188, at 2 (“[The Rule] transforms institutional
disciplinary processes into complex and expensive prosecutorial proceedings . . . . Colleges
and universities are not civil or criminal courts, nor should they be. The notion that they
should establish a parallel judicial structure to accomplish what the judicial system is
already responsible for makes no sense.”); Erica L. Green, DeVos’s Rules Bolster Rights of
Students Accused of Sexual Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/0
6/us/politics/campus-sexual-misconduct-betsy-devos.html [https://perma.cc/CY8Y-VTDW]
(Sept. 22, 2020) (“The new regulations . . . require colleges to hold live hearings during
which accusers and accused can be cross-examined to challenge their credibility.”).
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rife with controversy and nuance.238 These employees will also
have to determine how to apply the rape shield laws and what
testimony to permit. The complexity of trials generally, and sexual
assault cases specifically, increases the risk that employees will
make legal errors that will expose the school to liability and the
students to harm.
For these reasons, many schools may turn to in-house legal
counsel or hired attorneys to conduct these proceedings. However,
given the murky and unclear guidance in the 2020 Rule, it is not
a given that lawyers will necessarily make the process smoother
or more efficient. In fact, a comment from ninety-three law
professors to the proposed 2020 Rule indicated eighty areas of
concern239 where the proposed rule did not give enough “guidance
to recipients about their new obligations, to victims and alleged
harassers regarding their rights and responsibilities, and to the
public as a whole.”240 The 2020 Rule is neither simple nor clear,
and adding lawyers to the mix will not necessarily be a solution
that results in clarity or more effective implementation; instead, it
will likely result in greater costs for individuals and for schools.
While it may seem fair to bolster Title IX procedures, merely
substituting more process for fairness will not necessarily result
in greater equality. In fact, the Rule’s structure lends itself to
amplifying inequality in the system. Rather than the school
undertaking full responsibility for the investigation and
adjudication of complaints, students’ advocates will play a key role
in the process, notably at the mandatory live hearing. While
schools are required to provide an advocate for all student
complainants and respondents, the advocate does not need to be

238.
See ACE Letter, supra note 188, at 7 (“Given the trial-like complexity of the
processes mandated by the Regulations, campuses also must continually spend significant
time and money training new staff, and refreshing existing staff, on these new procedures,
as well as hiring outside counsel to advise them on compliance with these requirements.”).
239.
Maryam Ahranjani et al., Comment on Proposed Rule Concerning
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance (Feb. 15, 2019), https://harvardjlg.com/wp-content/uploads/s
ites/19/2020/03/93-Law-Professor-Comment-on-Title-IX-Questions-as-Filed.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/BEU5-6KET].
240.
Id.
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an attorney.241 Therefore, this system will advantage those
students who have the resources to hire a private attorney.242
Additionally, the mandated quasi-criminal courtroom system
will amplify the adversarial nature of both the proceedings and of
the school’s position vis-à-vis its students generally. It will impose
a number of financial costs in terms of training, time, and
achieving expertise in legal issues,243 and it will most likely
require schools to shift from the usual practice of having
community members (faculty, staff, students, or a combination)
determine responsibility and discipline.244
These new requirements of quasi-criminal courtroom
procedures coupled with scant and murky guidance245 will lead to
confusion, a vast use of school’s resources, and numerous appeals.
In essence, schools will now have to police the fine contours of a
trial as if they are courts of law. These one-size-fits-all, mandatory
quasi-criminal courtroom procedures for sexual assault cases pits
schools in an adversarial position against both complainants and
respondents. This is a sea change and reorientation of the school’s
role regarding students.
Critically, this reorientation is required solely for Title IX
proceedings and not for other school investigations involving
potentially criminal charges such as assault, drug possession, or
destruction of property.246 It also does not apply to charges
involving concerns of reputational harm such as plagiarism,

241.
ACE Letter, supra note 188, at 3; DEP’T OF EDUC., SUMMARY OF MAJOR
PROVISIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION’S TITLE IX FINAL RULE 7, https://www2.ed.
gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/titleix-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5MY-6572].
242.
ACE Letter, supra note 188, at 3–4 (“[The] ‘live hearing’ with direct
cross-examination . . . . raises serious equity concerns, as it can tip the scales in favor of a
party who is able and motivated to pay for a high-priced litigator, while the other may not
be willing or motivated to do so.”).
243.
See id. at 7 (describing the varied costs the new regulation imposes on schools);
R. Shep Melnick, Analyzing the Department of Education’s Final Title IX Rules on Sexual
Misconduct, BROOKINGS (June 11, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/analyzing-th
e-department-of-educations-final-title-ix-rules-on-sexual-misconduct/ [https://perma.cc/V5
ZK-N3CL].
244.
See Mann, supra note 92, at 644–46. For a review of the models that schools have
used in Title IX adjudication, see id.
245.
Ahranjani et al., supra note 239 (pointing out eighty areas of confusion in the
proposed rule).
246.
Anderson, supra note 13, at 2000 (“We should learn from that history and oppose
efforts to provide respondents accused of sexual misconduct on campus with special
procedural protections that would not be provided to them if they were accused of
plagiarism, nonsexual assault, burglary, or even, occasionally, homicide on campus.”).
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cheating, or race-based discrimination.247 Finally, it singles out
sexual harassment as compared to discrimination based on other
protected
categories,
including
other
forms
of
sex
discrimination.248
The results of a litigious procedure are not necessarily in the
best interests of any of the parties in this context. Educational
institutions will have to rebuild trust and relationships between
those involved as witnesses in this high-intensity adversarial
process. The court-like process for the respondent could heighten
reputational concerns as more individuals become involved in the
process, and there is a greater chance that a quasi-criminal trial
will lead to complainants leaving school, thus reducing the chance
of a just result. Finally, use of adversarial systems tends to harden
positions over time, increasing the likelihood that educational
institutions will start to impose more severe sanctions on
respondents and be less receptive to processes wherein the parties
work out an agreement, such as restorative or transformative
justice.249
Undoubtedly, Title IX proceedings require fairness, yet those
advocating for the 2020 Rule model must address the fact that this
model is inextricably linked to rape exceptionalism and the due
process distortion. These advocates circumscribe their procedural
concerns to the sexual assault context without addressing why or
whether these protections should apply to other disciplinary
situations on campuses involving similar quasi-criminal
allegations, or portending similar disciplinary sanctions or alleged
reputational harm.250 The concerns are squarely aimed solely at
247.
Id. at 1985, 2000; see also Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education
Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. 30,026, 30,264
(May 19, 2020) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106) (“Commenters asserted that currently
there is no presumption of non-responsibility for respondents in other student misconduct
proceedings, such as theft, cheating, plagiarism, and even physical assault. Commenters
argued that if the Department believes such a presumption is important in sexual
misconduct cases, then it should require the presumption in all student misconduct cases
for the sake of uniformity.”).
248.
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. at 30,264; see Anderson, supra note
13, at 1985, 1998 (“It would be unfair to single out sexual assault cases among all crimes
committed on campus and push them to the criminal courts. It would harm the learning
environment, deprive victims of equal educational opportunities, and violate students’ civil
rights under Title IX.”).
249.
See, e.g., Scarlett & Weyrick, supra note 71, at 394, 429, 432.
250.
See Anderson, supra note 13, at 1985–86 (noting—correctly—that those who
advocate for increased due process protection “must make the case for why respondents in
campus sexual assault cases should enjoy uniquely favorable rights—or make the case for
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sexual assault and are therefore neither fair nor just. It is possible
to avoid the political seesaw and instead build a carefully
constructed framework for Title IX adjudication that can fairly
and successfully balance the different interests involved.251
B. Principle Two: Protecting All Students
Title IX implementation, notably under the 2020 Rule, has
been increasingly viewed through the dual lenses of the due
process distortion and rape exceptionalism. These lenses, whether
imposed externally by the 2020 Rule or internally by the schools
themselves, or both, have shaped how schools think about the
problem of sexual assault on their campuses and how they frame
their responses.252 This has led to, among other consequences, the
importation of quasi-criminal courtroom systems, scrutiny of
complainants, and increased respondent-focused protections.253
Importantly, neither lens incorporates an intersectional focus and
therefore neither lens requires schools to investigate patterns of
discrimination on their campuses and how sexual assault
intersects with marginalized identities. In fact, schools have
traditionally approached “sexual violence from an identity-neutral
and power-evasive perspective.”254 However, schools have Title IX
obligations to all students, of all identities, and OCR must
mandate that they meet them. Schools need to break out of their
traditionally limited approaches to create systems that recognize
the reality of how sexual assault functions on the ground on their
campuses for all their students.
1. Studying Who Is at Risk. Dominant social narratives
around campus vulnerability to sexual assault often center on the

increased process rights for all students accused of misconduct—neither of which, so far,
they have done”).
251.
Mann, supra note 92, at 670–74; Cantalupo, supra note 210.
252.
For the criminal lens, see, for example, Javorka & Campbell, supra note 216, at
152, 158 (analyzing results of a qualitative study that “indicated that criminal justice
concepts and goals are indeed being conflated with and influencing university Title IX
proceedings”). For the procedural due process lens, see Carson & Nesbitt, supra note 21, at
333–34, stating “Although ‘due process’ has become the battle cry of the respondents’ rights
movement, the content of that battle cry does not match the meaning of due process as
determined by the courts.” (footnote omitted).
253.
See, e.g., Javorka & Campbell, supra note 216, at 158; see also Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 81–82, Victim Rts. L. Ctr. v. Rosenfelt, 988 F.3d 556
(1st Cir. 2021) (No. 20-1748).
254.
Harris & Linder, supra note 14, at xii.
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single-axis of White female survivors:255 “White women students
are foregrounded in the majority of college sexual violence
prevention and response efforts and in media stories concerning
sexual violence on campus.”256 These dominant narratives ignore
the reality that campuses are diverse places made up of
individuals with many different identities, all of whom are
protected by Title IX. The narratives are also often coupled with a
purportedly “race- and power-neutral perspective”257 that has led
to approaches to sexual assault that have often failed to account
for the experiences of those who do not fit the dominant identities
or stereotypes of the sexual assault survivor. For example, the
push by schools to criminalize sexual assault on campuses ignores
the “tumultuous and racist history of the relationship between
legal systems and communities of color,”258 and the resultant
complex effects on student survivors of color,259 including a
reluctance to report when an internal school complaint is linked
with a police response.260 In addition, educational institutions
255.
Devon W. Carbado & Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, An Intersectional Critique of Tiers
of Scrutiny: Beyond “Either/Or” Approaches to Equal Protection, 129 YALE L.J.F. 108, 128
(2019) (describing a “single-axis” framework as an approach to antidiscrimination law that
requires choosing race or gender, but not both, and recognizing that “[a]dvocates and
stakeholders within discursive communities . . . routinely reproduce precisely the
‘single-axis’ frameworks that privilege and foreground group members whose narratives of
injustice fit the either/or parameters of equality claims”); see Harris, supra note 114, at 42
(“[T]he unilateral focus on white women obscures other student populations’ experiences
with sexual violence.”).
256.
Harris, supra note 114, at 42 (citing Kelle Barrick et al., Intimate Partner Violence
Victimization Among Undergraduate Women at Historically Black Colleges and
Universities (HBCUs), 19 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1014 (2013)); Wagatwe Wanjuki,
College Rape: Does the Media Focus Only on White Survivors?, MIC (Apr. 29, 2013), https://w
ww.mic.com/articles/38363/college-rape-does-the-media-focus-only-on-white-survivors [htt
ps://perma.cc/L5QN-TZFV].
257.
Chris Linder & Jess S. Myers, Intersectionality, Power, Privilege, and CampusBased Sexual Violence Activism, in INTERSECTIONS OF IDENTITY AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE ON
CAMPUS, supra note 14, at 175, 176.
258.
Id.
259.
See Scarlett & Weyrick, supra note 71, at 410. Harris, supra note 112, at 601
(“[T]he experience of rape for black women includes not only a vulnerability to rape and a
lack of legal protection radically different from that experienced by white women, but also
a unique ambivalence. Black women have simultaneously acknowledged their own
victimization and the victimization of black men by a system that has consistently ignored
violence against women while perpetrating it against men.”).
260.
Amelia Roskin-Frazee, Protections for Marginalised Women in University Sexual
Violence Policies, 9 INT’L J. FOR CRIME, JUST. & SOC. DEMOCRACY, Mar. 2020, at 13, 18
(examining the inverse linkage between coordinated school-law enforcement response and
effective intersectional approaches); Cantalupo, supra note 189, at 231 (noting victims of
color may be suspicious of criminal justice actors like police); Gruber, supra note 169, at
604 (“To the extent that feminism is as much for women of color as for white women and it
condemns racial hierarchy, it should regard as intolerable legal changes that elevate the
already insufferable level of racial injustice in the criminal system and society.”).
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produce materials about Title IX and sexual assault that “rarely
examine[] race, class, or sexual orientation in relationship to
sexual violence.”261 This often sends the message to marginalized
students that their lived experiences, which are influenced by
race, class, and sexual orientation (among other identities), are not
seen by the institution.262
Further, approaches under Title IX have often failed to
account for definitions of sex beyond biological sex, and thus have
not reflected the broader experiences of LGBTQIA+ students.
Although a Title VII case, the Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock
incorporated gender identity and sexual orientation within the
meaning of “sex,” laying the foundation for Title IX to follow
suit.263 Approaches to sexual assault need to address these larger
conceptions of gender and recognize the vulnerabilities that those
who identify as men, trans*, nonbinary, gay, or a combination, face
when making complaints of sexual assault,264 including when the
school reports such cases to the police.
An intersectional approach is crucial in the Title IX context to
account for vulnerabilities to, experiences with, and responses to
sexual assault on college campuses. Intersectionality recognizes
that individuals inhabit spaces at the intersection of their
identities and face differential forms of discrimination.265 As
Kimberlé Crenshaw, visionary founder of “intersectionality,”
explains:
Intersectionality was a prism to bring to light dynamics
within discrimination law that weren’t being appreciated by
261.
Linder & Myers, supra note 257, at 176.
262.
Id.; Scarlett & Weyrick, supra note 71, at 410.
263.
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020); see also Exec. Order No.
13,988, 86 Fed. Reg. 7023, 7023 (Jan. 20, 2021) (“Under Bostock’s reasoning, laws that
prohibit sex discrimination—including Title IX . . . —prohibit discrimination on the basis
of gender identity or sexual orientation, so long as the laws do not contain sufficient
indications to the contrary.” (citation omitted)).
264.
“Research suggests that male survivor disclosure rates are lower than female
disclosure rates, because male survivors of sexual violence feel isolated because of the
common misconception that men are not victims.” Palacios & Aguilar, supra note 127, at
200–01. Educational institutions’ materials about sexual assault are often heteronormative
and genderist, sending the message to students that only certain types of sexual assault are
seen within the institution. Id. at 200; see also Cantalupo, supra note 13, at 60, 66 n.390.
265.
Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 149 (“This apparent contradiction is but another manifestation
of the conceptual limitations of the single-issue analyses that intersectionality challenges.
The point is that Black women can experience discrimination in any number of ways and
that the contradiction arises from our assumptions that their claims of exclusion must be
unidirectional.”).
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the courts. In particular, courts seem to think that race
discrimination was what happened to all black people across
gender and sex discrimination was what happened to all
women, and if that is your framework, of course, what
happens to black women and other women of color is going
to be difficult to see.266

By intentionally focusing on the way these identities intersect and
affect individuals’ lived experiences, intersectionality provides the
framework to combat the erasure267 or invisibility268 of those with
multiple marginalized identities, whose experiences are often not
accounted for in mainstream narratives, including those in
campus sexual assault.269
Thus, the first step is for OCR to require and incentivize
schools to investigate, using an intersectional lens, the contours of
sexual assault on their campuses.270 Statistically, students with
marginalized identities face heightened vulnerabilities to sexual
harassment and sexual assault in larger society.271 Few studies
examine how marginalized identities and sexual assault interact
in educational institutions so schools must examine how these
dynamics affect their communities.272 As places of learning and
study, schools have the tools to research this issue and to think
critically about how to gather the needed information. Schools can
leverage the knowledge of those with expertise on campus to
determine how to frame and ask questions. For example, the main
studies on rates of sexual assault on college campuses are
differentiated solely by the binary of “man” or “woman” and do not
266.
Jane Coaston, The Intersectionality Wars, VOX, https://www.vox.com/the-highlig
ht/2019/5/20/18542843/intersectionality-conservatism-law-race [https://perma.cc/BB8G-KJ
UQ] (May 28, 2019, 9:09 AM).
267.
Crenshaw, supra note 265, at 140.
268.
Cantalupo, supra note 13, at 79; Harris & Linder, supra note 14, at xiv.
269.
See Brake, supra note 13, at 137 (“[I]n the debate over the [preponderance of the
evidence] standard, race has entered into the discussion only in terms of the effect on men
of color, and African-American men in particular, who are accused of sexual
misconduct. . . . Women of color are often invisible in the analysis even when they are
complainants.”). See generally INTERSECTIONS OF IDENTITY AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE ON
CAMPUS, supra note 14.
270.
See Cantalupo, supra note 13, at 72–73 (recognizing the importance of
researching female students of color’s experiences of sexual harassment, including the race
of the alleged harassers); Harris, supra note 114, at 42; Trachtenberg, supra note 161, at
158 (arguing DOE should require schools to “collect demographic data (including
race/ethnicity, sex, disability status, and income) for all students receiving suspension and
expulsion[] . . . disaggregated by offense”). See generally INTERSECTIONS OF IDENTITY AND
SEXUAL VIOLENCE ON CAMPUS, supra note 14.
271.
Cantalupo, supra note 13, at 42–44; Scarlett & Weyrick, supra note 71, at 412.
272.
Cantalupo, supra note 13, at 20.
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indicate whether these definitions are based on biological sex,
gender identity, or other factors.273 These terms leave important
questions unasked and unanswered and also fail to incorporate the
intersections of multiple identities. Therefore, in order to get an
accurate assessment of vulnerability, schools must modernize both
the tools that they use and the questions that they ask. This
requires involving the school’s diversity, equity, and inclusion
officer.274 When schools start studying the complex intersections of
identity and vulnerability, they will begin to build the knowledge
to calibrate their approaches to the varied needs of those
affected275 and better structure an effective intersectional
response.
2. Analyzing How Power and Identity Interact. It is not
enough for schools to study vulnerabilities and how they intersect
with identity. It is also critical for schools to chart how power276
and identity intersect on their campuses for both complainants
and respondents. Tracing how power works on their campuses will
assist schools with moving from a simple individual analysis of
cases to a broader systemic analysis of what structures protect

273.
Robert W.S. Coulter & Susan R. Rankin, College Sexual Assault and Campus
Climate for Sexual- and Gender-Minority Undergraduate Students, 35 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 1351, 1352 (2020) (“With sexual- and gender-minority students (e.g., lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender [LGBT] people) comprising a substantial size of the
undergraduate population . . . sexual assault among these populations is a substantial
public health concern worthy of further research.”).
274.
It is increasingly common to have diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) offices,
officers, or both, deans, and directors at educational institutions. See Caitlyn Clauson &
John McKnight, Welcome to Campus: Planning for Diversity, Inclusion, and Equity, PLAN.
FOR HIGHER EDUC. J., Oct.–Dec. 2018, at 39, 40–41 (discussing growth in chief diversity
officer positions in higher education and institutionalization of equity and diversity work).
275.
Jason C. Garvey et. al, Queer-Spectrum Student Sexual Violence, in
INTERSECTIONS OF IDENTITY AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE ON CAMPUS, supra note 14, at 155, 164–
65.
276.
Power has many manifestations, including authoritative and social power. Social
power exists in individual and larger group contexts. As authors Paula Popovich and
Michael Warren note, “‘Power’ can be defined in a general way as ‘the ability to act or
produce an effect,’ as well as more specifically, the ‘possession of control, authority or
influence over others.’ In psychology, the discussion of social power usually involves a
reference to ‘influence,’ although the words are not completely synonymous.” Paula M.
Popovich & Michael A. Warren, The Role of Power in Sexual Harassment as a
Counterproductive Behavior in Organizations, 20 HUM. RES. MGMT. REV. 45, 47, 49 (2010)
(citation omitted) (quoting Power, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.me
rriam-webster.com/dictionary/power [https://perma.cc/68CE-5NCV] (March 16, 2009)); see
also Elizabeth Bernstein, Power’s Role in Sexual Harassment, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj
.com/articles/powers-role-in-sexual-harassment-1517844769 [https://perma.cc/2F4G-HBN
Q] (Feb. 5, 2018, 10:33 AM).
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and/or harm complainants and respondents.277 These structures
could even be ones that are implemented by the school itself, such
as placing sexual assault resources in the Women’s Center, which
sends the message to those who do not identify as women that
there is not a place for them within the school.278
Under the traditional power-neutral perspective, the
dominant discourse places alcohol,279 male athletes,280 and
fraternities281 at the center of sexual assault prevention and
response. As a result, many schools’ prevention strategies focus on
alcohol policies and the monitoring of athletes and fraternities.282
While there are clear correlations between sexual assault, alcohol,
and fraternities,283 these approaches focus more on the symptoms
than on the disease. They require us to focus on individual
interactions instead of the larger perspective of how power is
structured in the college community.284 They fail to answer (or
even ask) important questions such as who has power within the
college ecosystem, who is recognized as a survivor, and who is
277.
Inequity is produced at the structural level and is affected by narrative. See, e.g.,
Nicola Phillips, Power and Inequality in the Global Political Economy, 93 INT’L AFFS. 429,
440 (2017); Brett Davidson, The Role of Narrative Change in Influencing Policy, ON THINK
TANKS (July 20, 2016), https://onthinktanks.org/articles/the-role-of-narrative-change-in-inf
luencing-policy/ [https://perma.cc/K63R-SXZ3].
278.
Palacios & Aguilar, supra note 127, at 200–01.
279.
Harris & Linder, supra note 124, at 1, 5 (“Researchers and educators have placed
a heavy focus on addressing alcohol consumption rather than power, privilege, and
domination.”).
280.
Athletes often hold powerful social capital on campus through the important roles
that sports play, including financially, for schools. See Brake, supra note 13, at 117–19
(“Some of the most egregious stories of institutional failure and the re-victimization of
complainants involve reports of sexual assault by male athletes, particularly elite male
athletes who are highly valued members of big-time university athletic programs.”). When
analyzing the power dynamics sports membership plays on campus, it is important to
acknowledge the racialization of the male athlete. See id. at 145–46 (charting the role that
race plays in public perceptions of male athletes and reporting on sexual assaults at
schools).
281.
Harris & Linder, supra note 124, at 10 (“For instance, the proposal to ban women
from fraternity houses at the University of Missouri negates the root causes of sexual
violence. This policy places the responsibility to avoid rape on women students; if they stay
out of specific spaces they will be safe from sexual violence. Yet by placing the onus on
women and not the privileged and dominating environments of fraternities, this policy
overlooks the history and embeddedness of patriarchy, power, and male privilege that
contribute to sexual violence in this particular setting.”).
282.
See id.
283.
See id. at 4–5 (citing studies on the connection between alcohol and sexual
assault).
284.
Jessica C. Harris, Women of Color Undergraduate Students’ Experiences with
Campus Sexual Assault: An Intersectional Analysis, 44 REV. HIGHER EDUC. 1, 3–4 (2020)
(“[T]his study exhibits how intersecting systems of domination embedded throughout
institutions, and not only individual behaviors, such as students’ alcohol consumption,
contribute to the perpetuation of violence against Women of Color on campus.”).
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likely to be believed (or not believed). “[T]he conversation on
sexual violence must expand to include perspectives, identities,
and histories that are rarely if ever explored in the discourses on
sexual violence. Furthermore, this discourse must acknowledge
and center power, privilege, and oppression.”285
Schools must study how systems of power and privilege
interact with identity and affect students in their communities in
order to craft effective responses, especially within their
investigatory systems. Otherwise, any strategies to prevent or
respond to sexual assault on college campuses will continue to
privilege those who already have the most power.286 Given the
prevalence of sexual assault on college campuses and the
disproportionate rates at which individuals with marginalized
identities experience sexual assault, it is crucial to locate and
address the often invisible and at times insurmountable barriers
and power dynamics that keep marginalized students excluded
from the very systems meant to help them.287 This should include
the possibility of creating an entirely different system.288
3. Creating Innovative Models. Schools have historically
followed, and OCR has not addressed their following, the
traditional legal model of addressing discrimination in silos; in
other words, they handle discrimination cases one identity at a
285.
Harris & Linder, supra note 14, at xii; see also Margaret Drew, It’s Not
Complicated: Containing Criminal Law’s Influence on the Title IX Process, 6 TENN. J. RACE,
GENDER, & SOC. JUST. 191, 212–13 (2017) (describing how when an observer lacks a
trauma-informed lens, a survivor’s response that does not match the “mythical norm” may
seem to deplete his or her credibility, which can complicate the investigation and
prosecution—an effect that is “compounded” if a “survivor is gay, transgender, a person of
color, or belongs to another marginalized group”).
286.
See Brake, supra note 13, at 139 (recognizing “complainants with the least social
privilege” are negatively impacted the most because they are less likely to report, less
trusting of the criminal justice system, and “do not match up with cultural stereotypes
about ‘real’ (e.g., credible) victims of sexual assault”); Harris & Linder, supra note 14, at
xiv (“As a society and as educators, we fail to understand the complexities of power,
privilege, and entitlement related to sexual violence. Relying on stereotypes about race,
gender, and sexual orientation allows the dominant perpetrator—an economically
privileged, straight, cisgender white man—to continue to commit sexual violence because
we do not see them as perpetrators.”); Roskin-Frazee, supra note 260, at 16 (“[C]urrent
school practices appear to disenfranchise survivors with marginalised identities when
schools lack cultural competency training, accessible health care, and reporting
mechanisms that are separate from law enforcement.”).
287.
Harris & Linder, supra note 124, at 10 (“[C]atchall [ahistorical] policies not only
negate students’ intersectional identities and multiple systems of domination but also
obscure how a history [of] colinization [sic], terrorization, and domination continue to
influence sexual violence in higher education.”).
288.
Scarlett & Weyrick, supra note 71, at 438–49 (describing how transformative
justice can be an effective alternative to the classic Title IX models).
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time.289 Take the example of a student at a college who has been
discriminated against on the basis of race and sex. This student
typically will have to make two separate complaints: one for
race-based discrimination and one for sex-based discrimination.
These complaints typically will be handled separately, with the
student having to participate in two different investigations and
hearings.290 This process forces students to literally carve up their
identities to examine each fact that occurred and ascribe it either
to sex or to race. It ignores the fact that individuals, including the
hypothetical students in question, can experience discrimination
based on how those identities interact with each other—as
discrimination that is simultaneously racialized and gendered.291
Students who believe that the discrimination is a combination of
both their race and sex must grapple with overcoming the clear,
structural bias from the institution—as reflected in the two
different processes—that discrimination can only occur one
identity at a time.292
The 2020 Rule exacerbates this intersectional conflict in two
ways. First, when it comes to defining what constitutes a hostile
environment, it inexplicably changes the traditional “severe,
persistent, or pervasive” definition293 to that of “severe, pervasive,
and objectively offensive.”294 In doing so, it fundamentally changes

289.
See Crenshaw, supra note 265, at 140; Suero, supra note 143, at 140–41
(examining through the lens of Latina & Latino Critical Legal Theory how the courts treat
Latina’s claims of sexual harassment in the workplace one identity at a time).
290.
See, e.g., HARVARD COLLEGE, STUDENT HANDBOOK: ACADEMIC YEAR 2021–2022
50 (2021), https://handbook.college.harvard.edu/files/collegehandbook/files/harvardcollege_
studenthandbook_2021_2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6RT-YRXM].
291.
See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 110, at 116 (“To be exact, [harassment of Black
actress Leslie Jones] constituted intersectional race and sex harassment because it relied
on both racial and gendered stereotypes of black women and involved racialized sexism
against a black woman.”); Cho, supra note 141, at 209 (“[N]ew frameworks that integrate
race and gender should be developed to account for the multi-dimensional character of
harassment that occurs and is challenged across races, social classes, and borders. The law’s
current dichotomous categorization of racial discrimination and sexual harassment (to
name only two) as separate spheres of injury is inadequate to respond to racialized sexual
harassment.” (footnote omitted)).
292.
Suero, supra note 143, at 138–39; see also Carbado & Crenshaw, supra note 255,
at 121–22.
293.
See OFF. FOR C.R., 2001 GUIDANCE, supra note 41, at vi (referring to sexual
harassment as “conduct of a sexual nature is sufficiently severe, persistent, or pervasive”
(emphasis added) (quoting 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,041 (Mar. 13, 1997))).
294.
This standard comes from Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, where the
Supreme Court found an implied private right of action in Title IX, and, therefore,
concomitantly heightened the standard of proof to find a violation. See Davis v. Monroe
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 639–40, 651–52 (1999) (“This Court has indeed recognized
an implied private right of action under Title IX . . . .”).
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what is covered under Title IX sexual harassment claims295 by
imposing additional burdens on individuals alleging sexual
harassment
than
on
individuals
alleging
race-based
harassment.296 Second, the 2020 Rule permits schools to depart
from a “preponderance of the evidence” standard for their
disciplinary systems in sex-based discrimination cases297 while
continuing to require the “preponderance of the evidence”
standard for other forms of discrimination, such as race-based
discrimination.298
Therefore, in harassment cases, students who think that they
have been discriminated against on the basis of sex and race have
to not only carve up their identities in deciding what
discriminatory acts ascribe to which identity but also have to
satisfy different legal standards if they choose to move forward
with both a sex-based discrimination claim and a race-based
discrimination claim. As Nancy Chi Cantalupo explains:
[I]f a school has adopted different evidentiary standards for
sexual and racial harassment, what happens when a woman
of color is sexually and racially harassed? What standard will
be used if she experiences racialized sexual harassment or
sexualized racial harassment? Will she be a woman first or a

295.
The 2020 Rule’s definition removes from protection a range of situations that
would be covered under both school conduct codes for sexual harassment and Title IX
jurisprudence. In the sexual assault context, the new definition arguably does not even
cover one instance of sexual assault, as one instance cannot satisfy the “pervasive”
standard. See, e.g., Francoeur v. D.L., No. 15cv953, 2017 WL 4247385, at *6–7 (D. Conn.
Sept. 25, 2017) (“The instant case involves conduct which, while undoubtedly embarrassing,
degrading, and offensive to A.F., was a one-time occurrence and thus not pervasive.”); GP
ex rel. JP v. Lee Cnty. Sch. Bd., 737 F. App’x 910, 915 (11th Cir. 2018) (“The battery of
November 22, 2013 was certainly severe, but it was a single incident and thus was unlikely
to have the systemic effect of depriving [the plaintiff] of an educational benefit.”).
296.
BAKER ET AL., supra note 49, at 4 (“Other educational civil rights statutes like
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits race discrimination by educational
institutions and is also enforced by OCR, use a preponderance of the evidence standard.”);
id. at 6 (“Tolerating a different standard from the preponderance standard in cases
involving sexual violence or other forms of gender-based harassment would allow schools
to provide less legal protection to student victims of sexual harassment than the vast
majority of comparable populations involved in civil, civil rights and student disciplinary
proceedings, all of which overwhelmingly use the preponderance standard.”).
297.
34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(1)(vii).
298.
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1–2, Know Your IX v. DeVos,
(D. Md. Oct. 20, 2020) (No. RBD-20-01224) (“Until now, [the Department of Education] has
imposed the same responsibilities on recipients to respond to harassment based on sex that
it imposes on them to respond to harassment based on race, national origin, and
disability.”).
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person of color first? Which of her identities will the school
declare to be the important one?299

Additionally, because such an individual would face a higher
burden in proving her sex-based claim, she is incentivized to make
a complaint based on race first or on race only. This will further
disincentivize reporting sexual assault. The lack of reporting
already impairs educational institutions’ ability to determine the
contours of the sexual assault problem both nationally and in their
institutions, and therefore this siloed approach, which is amplified
by the 2020 Rule’s new standards, further hampers overall Title
IX enforcement.
OCR should mandate that educational institutions create
systems that allow individuals to make intersectional complaints
based on their lived experiences. While the court system has been
resistant to plaintiffs making combined-identity claims,300
educational institutions are not under the same set of constraints
and can be more flexible. OCR and schools can leverage current
research on the intersections of identity, power, and sexual assault
in order to craft investigatory systems that are responsive to the
reality that students inhabit multiple identities. This should
include moving beyond identity silos to build systems that can
address, in the same process, the multiple forms of discrimination
that a student might be facing.301
OCR’s Title IX guidance and enforcement should start to
overtly recognize that as places of learning and research, schools
should be expected to investigate, study, and develop systems that
are responsive to the intersectional realities their students
inhabit. In so doing they can leverage their skills and position to
understand the problem of sexual assault in all its complexity on

299.
Cantalupo, supra note 13, at 6 (footnote omitted).
300.
Carbado & Crenshaw, supra note 255, at 114, 120–21 (discussing the lack of
intersectionality in a gender discrimination case and an affirmative-action case); see also
Degraffenreid v. Gen. Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142, 143 (E.D. Mo. 1976)
(applying a single-axis race or gender approach in a discrimination suit brought by Black
women to establish that they could bring separate causes of action for racism or sexism,
“but not a combination of both”).
301.
While schools have not traditionally developed intersectional systems, they are
not prohibited from doing so. The 2010 Dear Colleague Letter on Bullying is one example
of how an intersectional lens can be used. See HARASSMENT AND BULLYING LETTER, supra
note 94, at 3 (allowing for an inquiry that covers multiple axes of discrimination when
discussing how schools should address bullying, stating that “if the abusive behavior is on
the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, or disability, and creates a hostile environment,
a school is obligated to respond in accordance with the applicable federal civil rights
statutes and regulations enforced by OCR”).
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campus.302 From there, education and prevention efforts can be
developed that better address students’ particularized needs and
vulnerabilities. The principles of intersectionality and the data
that schools uncover must guide the work moving forward303 so
that they can effectuate Title IX’s promise for all who are affected
by sex-based discrimination.
VI. CONCLUSION
Title IX is about ensuring equal access to education based on
sex. In this moment of transition, the new Administration and key
stakeholders should refocus on returning to the core aims and
principles of Title IX, separate and apart from Title IX’s
politicization. This requires a strong commitment to Title IX’s
principles of equality and access. Critical examination of the role
that identity has played in Title IX implementation and
enforcement is a key component of effectuating the promise of Title
IX in today’s reality.
Through the 2020 Rule, the DeVos DOE fundamentally
altered the relationship between schools and their students when
it comes to sexual harassment and Title IX. By incorporating
mandatory quasi-criminal courtroom investigatory models into
Title IX adjudication, the 2020 Rule forces schools to stray from
their educational purpose and transforms classrooms into
courtrooms. Relying on the due process distortion, the 2020 Rule
imports quasi-criminal due process rights into the educational
context, dissuading complainants from engaging in the Title IX
disciplinary process and reducing the likelihood that complainants
receive the remedies they need to retain their equal access to
education.
At its core, it is critical for all interest groups—DOE, schools,
complainants, respondents, and advocates—that the process that
is used is one that is fair and that they can have confidence in.
There is a mismatch between schools’ educational missions and
the 2020 Rule’s quasi-criminal courtroom requirements. This is
not to say that schools can use any process or abandon fairness.

302.
See, e.g., Donna Coker, Restorative Responses to Campus Sexual Harm: Promising
Practices and Challenges, 1 INT’L J. RESTORATIVE JUST. 385, 386, 388–89 (2018)
(recommending restorative justice as a tool for a public-health approach to changing the
campus climate and responding to sexual assault that is uniquely available at the
university-level).
303.
Cantalupo, supra note 13, at 9 (recommending steps to “put women students of
color’s experiences at the center of our legal responses to sexual harassment”).
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Rather, the process that is used should be one that is more
appropriate for the educational environment and should leverage
educational institutions’ strengths rather than require them to
import legal courtroom systems. The mandatory quasi-criminal
courtroom procedures for sexual assault cases pit schools in an
adversarial position against students—even respondents, who are
favored by the 2020 Rule. This is a sea change and an
inappropriate reorientation of the school’s role regarding students.
Additionally, the 2020 Rule is rooted in notions of rape
exceptionalism, which has swung the pendulum of Title IX rights
towards respondents when the correct calibration is to provide a
fair system, including one that gives equal rights to both sides. As
a result of focusing on protecting allegedly wrongfully accused
respondents and the unsupported belief that 90% of sexual
accusations are highly problematic,304 the 2020 Rule created a set
of procedures that are out of step with the equality mandate of
Title IX, the educational context in which Title IX is implemented,
and the other civil rights laws enforced by DOE, including other
forms of sex discrimination covered by Title IX.305 While it may
seem fairer to bolster Title IX procedures, merely substituting
more process for fairness will not result in equality.
Instead of focusing on justifications rooted in the due process
distortion and rape exceptionalism, the focus should be on
calibrating the Title IX process used to the allegation and the
specific school setting, thus allowing educational institutions the
ability to determine, within Title IX limits, processes that align
with their educational community.306 “By carefully crafting
disciplinary systems, educational institutions can effectuate the
statutorily-based equality mandate of Title IX” in a way that is
consistent with fairness and procedural due process.307

304.
See Green & Stolberg, supra note 80.
305.
See, e.g., 2021 Q&A, supra note 86, at 31 (“The 2020 amendments explain that the
grievance process required for formal sexual harassment complaints does not apply to
complaints alleging discrimination based on pregnancy, different treatment based on sex,
or other forms of sex discrimination.” (citing 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.8(c), 106.45 (referring to the
same grievance process as for “formal complaints of sexual harassment”))).
306.
See, e.g., 2014 Q&A, supra note 73, at 24 (“The specific steps in a school’s Title IX
investigation will vary depending on the nature of the allegation, the age of the student or
students involved, the size and administrative structure of the school, state or local legal
requirements (including mandatory reporting requirements for schools working with
minors), and what it has learned from past experiences.”).
307.
See Mann, supra note 92, at 670–75 (recommending a way schools can craft such
a policy).
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Title IX must depart from the traditional model of examining
discrimination one identity at a time because it harms individuals
who hold multiple marginalized identities by forcing them to
separate their component identities into separate cognizable legal
claims. Using an intersectional lens would allow educational
institutions to craft more effective disciplinary systems. The lens
of power, privilege, and oppression must be brought to bear on
analyzing how sexual assault functions within educational
institutions. While we are aware that models need to change, we
do not yet have a ready set of well-studied policies on how to
address sexual assault with an effective intersectional approach.
The necessity to account for marginalized identities,308 and how
identity and sexual assault intersect, has not been recognized in
any systematic way by DOE to date and must be a priority moving
forward.
The challenge, as issued by Harris and Linder, is that “[w]e,
as a field, must ground this issue in history, account for all
identities and institutional types, and explore the influence of
interlocking systems of domination in sexual violence across
college campuses.”309 Until we do so, Title IX will remain an
unfulfilled promise. Moving forward, this focus must be a priority
in DOE’s guidance documents, Title IX enforcement, and schools’
Title IX implementation.

308.
See supra Section V.B.1 (explaining why I focus on the identity of race in this
Article). There are many marginalized identities that an intersectional approach to Title
IX must account for in order to fully address sex discrimination in higher education. For an
extensive discussion of identities and Title IX, see generally Chris Linder, Reexamining
Our Roots, in INTERSECTIONS OF IDENTITY AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE ON CAMPUS, supra note
14, at 60, 60–78. See also Scarlett & Weyrick, supra note 71, at 428.
309.
Harris & Linder, supra note 14, at xiii.
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